THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IRAN AND UNITED STATES
Limo ( ???) STUDENT’S ID:s06138
Paoer Supervisor : Dr. Sekou Conde
Minzhu University of China
2006-2007 Academic Year
As us known,Iran is a powerful country in Middle East, and lots of oil is in this country. Now it’s developing nuclear as civil usage. But USA consider that iran is making nuclear weapon. So USA criticize Iran for this. That make the relationship between Iran and USA becoming nervous.
1??/span>Back in the day, Iran and the United States were companion.
In 1955, Iran joined the Cold War on the USA.’s side by hitching itself to the Middle East Treaty Organization (later known as the Central Treaty Organization). METO was a sort of Southwest Asian equivalent of NATO.
In 1971, Iran’s ruler, Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, threw a $100 million party to celebrate 2,500 years of Iranian monarchy. The menu included one ton of caviar, 5,000 bottles of vintage wine and champagne, and a roasted peacock stuffed with foie gras. U.S. Vice President Spiro Agnew was an honored guest.
In 1973, when Arab nations stopped selling oil to the United States to retaliate against American support for Israel during that year’s Arab-Israeli War, Iran kindly (and quite profitably) increased its oil exports to America.
Because the Arab oil embargo quadrupled the price of crude oil, Iran suddenly found itself rolling in some serious dough while the U.S. economy was struggling. Good pal to America that it was, Iran kindly began sending some of the money back here by becoming the largest foreign customer of the U.S.’s high-tech weapons industry.
By the late 1970s, the U.S. and Iran were so BFF that President Carter praised Iran as "an island of stability in one of the most troubled areas of the world."
Just like me and that kid across the street who was the first person in the neighborhood to get an Atari, the United States wasn't really good friends with Iran. The U.S. was friends with Iran's stuff, mostly its oil.
Iran still sits atop some of the largest oil and natural gas deposits in the world. Western powers have been jockeying for power and influence in Iran ever since it became clear that oil was replacing coal as the most favored fuel of Western nations.
During the first half of the century, it was Russia and the United Kingdom that did most of the jockeying. During WWII, the Soviet Union and Great Britain even invaded Iran to ensure the country remained in the Allied camp. Iran was important both for its oil and because it provided a safe supply route for American war materials to reach the Soviets.
When they invaded, Russia and the U.K. exiled Iran's king, Reza Shah Pahlavi, and replaced him with his peacock-snackin' son, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, who was just 20. Young, inexperienced and ineffectual, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi wasn't very good at standing up for his country's interests. Even though the U.K.'s power and influence went into steep decline after WWII, Pahlavi was unable and/or unwilling to stand up to the British-controlled Anglo-Iranian Oil Company that was, for all practical purposes, stealing Iran's oil.
Someone did stand up to British exploitation, though. His name was Mohammed Mossadegh. A popular nationalist and government minister, Mossadegh was elected prime minister by Iran's parliament in 1951 for the express purpose of asserting control over Iran's oil resources. Iran's government had taken control of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's domestic assets.
The Brits rather enjoyed not paying market value for Iranian oil, so they tried hard to bully Iran into reversing its action. They blockaded Iranian shipping. They also lobbied the United States for help in toppling Mossadegh. President Harry Truman declined. His successor, Dwight Eisenhower, accepted, and in 1953 Eisenhower dispatched the then-young CIA to carry out some regime change.
In the U.S.-engineered coup that ensued, Mossadegh --- Iran's only genuinely popular and relatively fairly elected democratic leader --- was toppled and arrested. After a brief period of exile, Pahlavi returned to power, and his ensuing autocracy was marked by greed, incompetence and cruelty. In 1979, decades of pent-up nationalism, hunger for democracy, and rural resentment of Pahlavi's Western ways exploded into a revolution that brought the current religious extremists to power.
Given all of the above, if you were Iranian, how would you feel about the United States?
2??/font>The relationship between Clinton government and Iran
It is in America’s strategic interests to seek normal relations with Iran. In Clinton govornment,On June 17, 1998, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright called for the United States and Iran to bring down the walls of mistrust between the two countries so that "we can develop with the Islamic Republic, when it is ready, a road map leading to normal relations." The official Iranian response has been muted and cautious. Critics of the administration argue that helping Khatami provides oxygen to the hardliners and keeps them in power. Supporters of the new Clinton policy believe the reverse: helping Khatami opens up Iranian society and ultimately weakens the hardliners. No matter who is right, there will be no real progress until six "red button" issues are addressed. They are: historic mutual grievances; terrorism; the U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf; Iran’s weapons programs; Iran’s opposition to Israel and the peace process; and, economic issues, especially sanctions and pipeline policies.
There has been a reduction in the harsh rhetoric between America and Iran. However, concrete improvements in the relationship now require actions by both sides, not words. It is unlikely that any of the "red button" issues can be resolved absent an official dialogue. A key U.S. objective, therefore, must be to work toward official contacts, a move Iran currently rejects. This does not require immediate diplomatic recognition, an exchange of ambassadors or even formal, high-level government-to-government meetings, but it must involve government officials from both sides. uch contacts can be helped by the citizen diplomacy called for by Khatami. owever, citizen diplomacy has its limits since it is, by its nature, uncoordinated and unstructured, representing different interest groups with different agendas.
The United States cannot stop Iran’ advanced missile development program. owever, with effective Russian cooperation it can slow down and delay missile production and development perhaps for 7-10 years. Iran’ nuclear weapons option is a longer-term but a more serious issue. Since Iran is a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), it can only proceed with a nuclear weapons program if it either violates or formally withdraws from the NPT. If Iran is in violation of the treaty, it will be subject to UN sanctions. If Iran chose to go the covert route to nuclear weapons production, it is doubtful that either Russia or China would support Iran. Likewise, Iran’s compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention, of which it is a State’s Party, is an important bellwether concerning its intentions.
On terrorism, the United States needs to distinguish between direct Iranian actions against Americans and U.S. allies and actions against Iran’s domestic opponents. The former is much more serious and unacceptable. On Israel and the peace process, Iran should be persuaded that it has much to lose if it continues to vilify Israel. No one expects the regime to support Israel, but formally decreeing Arafat the primary and legitimate interlocutor for the Palestinians would signal a tacit acceptance of recent developments in the region.
Other confidence building measures include indirect or multilateral talks on issues of mutual interest. Afghanistan and Iraq are two obvious candidates, as would be drug smuggling. In addition, speedier visa procedures should be adopted. There is no U.S. Diplomatic presence in Tehran. Iran could authorize there turn of a low-level consular officer to a friendly embassy in Tehran (probably Switzerland), thereby speeding up the cumbersome process of vetting Iranians for visas. Also, certain items from the U.S. sanctions list could be removed. For instance, the import of Persian rugs could be permitted and American companies could be allowed to export wheat and other non-strategic items to Iran.
Wild card events could abruptly change the dynamics of U.S. -Iran relations. The removal of Khatami and his replacement by a conservative mullah would put a freeze on prospects for detente. New congressional sanctions against the Iranian energy sector would have a chilling effect on diplomacy. The most serious event would be another successful terrorist attack on Americans with clear Iranian complicity. Some wildcards—i.e., the death of Saddam Hussein—would be viewed positively in the United States but would spark a more ambivalent reaction in Iran. On the other hand, an unexpected breakthrough in the Arab-Israeli peace process could make it much easier for Iran to trim its anti-Israeli rhetoric and, at the same time, reduce its support for Hizbollah, Hamas and Islamic Jihad. In event of such positive breakthroughs, the United States and Iran should consider a "grand bargain" that would seek to limit Iran’s nuclear and missile programs and open the door for U.S. -Iran cooperation on energy projects, including oil and gas pipelines from the Caspian through Iran.
3??/span>The relationship between Bush government and Iran
But in Bush government ,Iran is facing isolation, tightening UN sanctions and growing American pressure.
With a weak and isolated [...]
). If you have the permission, you can login now.