Abstract: In this paper, the topic is about the oil trade between China and Angola. As we know, Africa is very large, it includes five parts: North Africa, South Africa, East Africa, West Africa and Central Africa. In Africa, there are about 20 oil production countries, the oil output of Nigeria、Algeria、Libya、Angola and Egypt accounts for about 84 percent of the total output of Africa. And Angola is the new member of OPEC and it is the second-largest oil production countries in sub-Saharan Africa after Nigeria. Today, Angola is china’s most important partner on the African continent and it is the largest source of Chinese crude oil imports. Also, there is a friendly relationship between China and Angola since the civil war. And China gives their aid to the restructure of Angola after the civil war. So there is a long relationship between the two countries. But different people and countries have different views about the oil trade between China and Angola which are based on their own benefits. After the analysis, I think we should take an opening view to the oil trade between the two countries. From the world view, the oil trade between China and Angola and the energy cooperation between China and Africa are mutually influences and are the model of the win-win policy in China and Africa.

Keywords: oil trade, oil production, win-win policy

Introduction: In this paper, I will talk about the oil trade between China and Angola. The paper consists of four parts. In the first part, it is about the oil production in Africa, especially in Angola. By right of the abundant reserves and the predominant geography location, Africa has become a very important role to influence the contrast of the force between different oil production countries and also become a new battlefield for the international oil magnate to competition. At the same time, Angola is the second-largest oil production countries in sub-Saharan Africa after Nigeria and it is the most important partner of China in Africa. So the Africa absorbs many countries to investment and competition. In the second part, it is about the development of the oil trade between China and Angola. In January 12th 1983, China and Angola found the foreign relations. After the civil war of Angola in 2002, the bilateral relations of the two countries enter into a new developmental phase. China gives their aid to Angola government and enterprises in order to help Angola’s reconstruction. In the third part, it is about the different views toward the oil trade between the two countries. Some countries think that the oil trade between China and Angola is benefit to the development of Angola and the Africa, not only for the economy development but also for the political stabilization and the development of the whole world. However, some countries and people have the opposite views. They think that what is China done to Angola is due to its own benefit, such as improve its international status and get the sustain from African continent. The entire parlance is based on its own benefits. After the analysis, I give my recommendation about this topic. From the world view, the oil trade between China and Angola and the energy cooperation between China and Africa are mutually influences and are the model of the win-win policy in China and Africa. Both the two countries can benefit from the cooperation, not only the economic development but also the political status. So we should take an opening view to the development of the two countries, especially during the oil trade.

The oil production in Africa, especially in Angola

During these years, with the roily situation of Middle East, the participation of the west force such as American, the demand of the oil for the world market and the shortage of the supply of the oil, the price of crude oil in the international market is always very high. “The price of every barrel is from 25 dollars average in 2001 to about 65 dollars in 2006.” [1]In order to guarantee the supply of crude oil and realize the diversification of the oil production, all the oil consumption countries put their eyes to Africa. By right of the abundant reserves and the predominant geography location, Africa has become a very important role to influence the contrast of the force between different oil production countries and also become a new battlefield for the international oil magnate to competition.

As we know, Africa is very large, it includes five parts: North Africa, South Africa, East Africa, West Africa and Central Africa. In Africa, there are about 20 oil production countries, the oil output of Nigeria、Algeria、Libya、Angola and Egypt accounts for about 84 percent of the total output of Africa. West Africa is one of the fastest-growing oil production regions in Africa and Mauritania, Mali and Niger will be among the list of oil producers in the next few years. “In Africa, the oil was first found in Algeria and Nigeria in 1956, according to the World’s Energy Statistics Data published on June 2007, up to the end of 2006, the oil reserves in all the countries of Africa was 117.2 billion barrels, which was just inferior to Middle East and Europe and in the third place in the world. According to the new materials, up to the end of 2006, the daily output of crude oil in African continent was about 9.99 million barrels, which accounted for 12.1 percent of the world oil production. And in the next five years, 25 percent of the oil output in the world will come from Africa.”[2]

As the new member of the OPEC (The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries), Angola is the second-largest oil production countries in sub-Saharan Africa after Nigeria. “Angolan government estimates that in 2008 the Angolan oil production will double in 2008 than in 2006, from 1 million barrels every day to 2 million barrels every day.”[3] Angola is moving to the world major oil-producing countries as its goal. “Their oil reserves which have been proved up are about 12.3 billion barrels.” [4]In the next ten years, Angola will compete the status of the largest oil production country in Africa with Niger. Angola is moving in the world major oil-producing countries of the goal.

Angola’s oil exploration and production activities began in the early 21st century; its crude oil output was less than 100,000 barrels every day until the 1970s. In 1975, Angola got rid of the colonial rule from the Portuguese and obtained national independence. Then Angola declared that all oil resources are owned by the State and issued a petroleum law, and then established the Ministry of Oil and the state oil company. This provides a legal guarantee to attract more foreign oil companies to enter Angola and then Angola’s oil industry is developing rapidly.

The oil producing areas in Angola are mainly distributed in the sea and under the control of the government, the oil production is less interference and the output of crude oil increased rapidly despite the continuous war in Angola. “To the beginning of this century the oil production has reached 800,000 barrels a day. From the 1980s, the Angolan oil exploration and exploitation activities gradually transferred to the deep sea areas and added its concession areas of marginal sea areas to 34.”[5] By 1990s, in Luanda and Kwanza, south of the estuary waters and Benguela Gulf waters, rich reserves of oil and oil fields were found constantly.

“The oil and gas industries, both considered highly promising, have attracted over $20 billion in foreign direct investment since 2003. The economy of Angolan is highly dependent on its oil sector, which accounts for over 40 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) and almost 90 percent of the government’s revenues.”[6]

The development of the oil trade between China and Angola

In January 12th 1983, China and Angola found the foreign relations. And after the foundation of the foreign relations between the two countries, the friendly cooperation relations of the two countries is growing fast, the cooperation and communication in every area is extending quickly. And during the international and regional affairs, the two countries keep favorable negotiation and cooperation too. In June 2006, the premier of Wen Jiabao visited Angola successfully, which was the first time of the China’s premier who gave a visitation to Angola after the foundation of the foreign relations of the two countries. And in November, the premier of Fernando of Angola which leads his group participated in the Beijing Summit of Forum of China-Africa Cooperation. The exchange visits of the two countries play an important role to the development of the two countries. After the civil war of Angola in 2002, the bilateral relations of the two countries enter into a new developmental phase.

2002, Angola’s civil war which was lasted for 27 years ended. During the war, there were about 500 thousand people dead and most of areas in the country became into in ruins. Frequently hampered by the war in Angola, hundreds of things in Angola were destroyed and the Angola government realized that it was a critical period for them to seek the rapid development. “It is for this reason, Angola attracted a lot of the state’s investment because it can be too much room, after all, here there is rich oil resources, which developed countries have a sufficient reason to be moved, as a major oil consumption countries and china is no exception.” [7]

Today, Angola is china’s most important partner on the African continent. Angola’s importance lies in the fact that it is the second-largest oil producer in Africa. In 2004, Angola became China’s largest supplier of crude oil on the African continent. “For instance, during January to March in 2006, Angola became China’s number one oil supplier, which exported 456,000 barrels a day to China, accounting for 15 percent of its total oil imports and surpassing Saudi Arabia.”[8] “During Vice Premier Zeng Peiyang’s visit in 2005, China granted the Angolan government a $6.3 million interest-free loan and additional $2.2 billion in soft loans in early 2006.”[9] In 2006, trade between China and Angola reached the $5 billion mark, making Angola China’s second-largest trading partner in Africa and making China Angola’s third-largest trading partner.

Angola accounted for half of China’s oil imports from Africa in 2005, according to the World Bank. China plays a much more significant role in Angola. “China and the United States are the major buyers of Angolan oil, both importing approximately 500,000 bpd as of late 2006. China is thus the buyer of nearly 40 percent of Angola’s total oil production, which also makes Angola the largest source of Chinese crude oil imports, surpassing Saudi Arabia as the largest source in 2005.”[10]

Different views about the oil trade between China and Angola

Facing the oil trade between chain and Angola, different countries have different views based on their own benefits. Some countries think that the oil trade between China and Angola is benefit to the development of Angola and the Africa, not only for the economy development but also for the political stabilization and the development of the whole world. However, some countries and people have the opposite views. They think that what is China done to Angola is due to its own benefit, such as improve its international status and get the sustain from African continent. The entire parlance is based on its own benefits.

The Angola government and the enterprises in Angola have the same views. They all welcome the oil trade between the two countries.

The civil war of Angola which was lasted for 27years was ended in April 2002, and after the civil war, the economy and trade between China and Angola grow fast and China helps Angola to restructure the basic establishment after the civil war with the loan. Angola was frequently hampered by the war, so it is a critical period for Angola to undertake all the things and to seek the rapid development. China gives their aid to the reconstruct basic establishment of the Angola.

Angola exports 25 percent of its oil production to China, Beijing has secured a major stake in future oil production with a $2 billion package of loans and aid that includes funds for Chinese companies to build railroads, schools, roads, hospitals, bridges, and offices. Chinese companies have also been active in infrastructure projects such as building roads, bridges, schools, shopping centers, office buildings and low cost housing projects. Early in the 2006, Chinese companies were awarded a major contract to restore the Benguela (a city in Angola) railroad at a cost of $300-500 million, which is the country’s major railroad. The Angola government believes that the oil trade between China and Angola can enhance the friendship of the two countries. And at the same time, the numbers of China communities which are indwelled in Angola are expanding. Jose Eduardo dos Santos, the president of Angola said that “We give our highly praise to China’s pragmatic attitude to Angola which can accelerate the establishment of the state.”[11] Marais, the financial minister of Angola said that “we are welcome all the new settlers with getting rid of the entire obstacle.”

The China oil company makes the cooperation with the Angola’s which provides some technology to the development of their company. Angola only has one refinery which was built in the middle 20^th century. Because of the lack of technology, the development of company is very slow.  “By the end of 2004, China’s contracted projects in Angola have reached a total of 776 million U.S. dollars contract to complete turnover of 156 million U.S. dollars. It is understood primarily China National Machinery and Equipment Import and Export Corporation, the Sichuan International Economic and Technical Cooperation Corporation iron. Shanghai Bell Corporation and the China National Machinery and foreign economic and technological cooperation and other related operations in Angola.”[12]

Most of the Chinese-Angolan cooperation agreements signed was related to the energy sector. China is also desperately looking for more secure oil deliveries and Angola is sub-Saharan Africa’s second largest oil producer. The Beijing and Luanda governments signed a general agreement on cooperation in the oil and gas sector and cooperation in the mineral resources sector - seeing Angola as an exporter and China as an importer. In addition to be a major energy import market, China is also one of the world’s main technology centers. One of the agreements therefore foresees a cooperation agreement between the Angolan Ministries of Petroleum and Geology and Mining and China’s National Commission for Development and Reform, focusing on technical aid.

“Sonangol, Angola’s state oil company, agreed on a long term supply of oil to China’s Sinopec oil company. Further, Sonangol and Sinopec are to jointly evaluate Angola’s offshore Block 3. Finally, China and Angola will jointly study plans for a new oil refinery in Angola.” [13]  “On May 10, 2006, Angola’s state-owned oil company Sonangol and China’s Sinopec launched a US$2.2 billion joint bid for blocks 17 and 18; these new blocks have estimated reserves of 3 billion barrels and 1.5 billion barrels respectively. These new blocks are likely to move Angola from the position of third-largest oil supplier to China to that of number two on a long term basis.”[14] So the Angola government and the enterprises think that the cooperation of the two countries is benefit to the development of themselves and they both do their best to accelerate the relationship of the two countries.

Otherwise, in the world some countries have the different views about the the relationship of the two countries. Some countries think that the oil trade between China and Angola is a threat to some developed countries which have the important status in Africa.

While Angola is only the sixth-largest exporter to the United States, supplying four percent of U.S. oil imports, its importance for U.S. energy security should not be underestimated. “This is particularly true in a period when many of the regions that have traditionally supplied the United States with its oil are witnessing significant political instability, such as in the case of Saudi Arabia, Venezuela and Nigeria. The remaining volatile situation in Iraq, and Iran’s continuous hostility toward the United States, further increases Angola’s importance for both powers.”[15]

When Western countries, especially the American, found that there is another competitor in Africa, maybe sometimes feel bad. On one hand, it is because of the benefit competition; on the other hand, it is on the think of strategic benefits. American oil companies have taken an important role in Angola’s oil sector with Angola’s opening to the west. However, China traditionally has maintained good relations with the former Marxist government of Angola, so it remains an important trade partner for Angola. “China’s hunt for oil in Africa has made it essentially the new colonial superpower in the region, surpassing the memories of prior imperial forces such as Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, Great Britain and France. And it has achieved that status in record time. Trade between China and Africa, which totaled $10 billion in 2000, soared to $39.7 billion in 2005.” [16]

Some countries think that China wants to obtain more supportment from the Africa countries in order to improve its status.

In a paper, it said that: “China is buying off the heart of the leader in Africa in order to get more confederates from developing countries and improve its soft strength overseas.” [17] Critics believe that the availability of the Chinese loan has encouraged Angola to resist pressure from the IMF and Western countries to improve the transparency of its oil sector and make other reforms. Improper use of the loan has in fact become a concern for the Chinese lenders as well, after reports that some of the money was to be spent on government propaganda for the 2006 general election. This led to Chinese intervention to ensure that its assistance was not put to improper use.

Skeptics also question whether China’s oil-backed loan model will deliver sustainable development for Angola, and for Africa as a whole. The Chinese “are bringing a combination of financial and technical power. But with less demands for transparency than the (rest of the) international community,” [18]says Pierre-Francois Pirlot, the Angola representative of the United Nations Development Program. They have a suspicion about whether the cooperation in the oil trade of the two countries can sustain a long time and whether it is the best method for the development for Angola.

Also, some countries make a connection between the help of China to Africa and the arms sales to Africa. A report says, “‘China’s Arms Sales: Motivations and Implications’by Daniel Byman and Roger Cliff for the RAND Corporation, says China’s government exerts strong central control over its arms exports and uses them as a foreign policy tool. Between 1955 and 1977, Le Monde reports, China sold $142 million worth of military equipment to Africa, and the pace of sales has picked up significantly since then. The Congressional Research Service reports China’s arms sales to Africa made up 10 percent of all conventional arms transfers to the continent between 1996 and 2003.”[19] Selling arms to African countries helps China cement relationships with African leaders and helps offset the costs of buying oil from them. They also think that China doesn’t have the same human rights concerns as the United States and European countries, experts say, so it will sell military hardware and weapons to other countries. In fact, China sees Africa as a growth market for its military hardware. “China’s active exploration of oil sources in Africa also leads to a need to ensure security around them, experts say, which has led Beijing to send Chinese military trainers to help their African counterparts. In return, China gains important African allies in the United Nations—including Sudan, Zimbabwe, and Nigeria—for its political goals, including preventing Taiwanese independence and diverting attention from its own human rights record.”[20]

Conclusions

For the relationship of the two countries, we should take an opening view. From the world view, the oil trade between China and Angola and the energy cooperation between China and Africa are mutually influences and are the model of the win-win policy in China and Africa.

First of all, the approximately balance of the economy and trade connections between China and Angola reflect the complementarities of the two countries. The import commodities from Angola in China are mainly the oil due to the demands of the China’s economy development. Angola is mainly importing advanced technological products from China due to the demands of the people in Angola. The intercourse of economy and trade between China and Angola is a bidirectional choice and it fully reflects the complementarities of the economy between the two countries.

Secondly, African countries, such as Angola sells its oil to China based on its free will, it is both a win-win thing and also a commercial behavior. The Angolan national oil company Sonangol is the sole concessionaire for oil exploration and production in Angola. The major international oil companies such as the BP, Chevron, Devon Energy, ExxonMobil, Maersk, Occidental, and Roc Oil take up an important status in Angola. So China does its best to avoid the conflict with the Euramerican companies. If Angola does not sell its oil to China, it also will sell it to other countries.

So the oil trade between China and Angola is not a threat to the Angola government and its enterprises. Although there maybe some conflicts between the two countries in some areas, it is also a favorable environment for the development of the two countries if they take the right attitude. The development of the world needs the cooperation of every country from different places and the development of every country also needs the globalization. It is a interact ional course and we should face this fact and do our best to confront this challenge.

References

1、Stenphanie Giry, “China’s Africa Strategy,” The New Republic, Vol.231, No.20, November 2004, P19.

2、Rory Carroll, “Chinese Premier Boosts Trade with Seven-nation Africa Tour,” The Guardian, June 22, 2006

3、“China, Africa, and oil”, Esther Pan, http://www.cfr.org/publication/9557

4、“Chinese American media machine is ‘clean’ African”, http://en.wjj.cc/MarketTrade/TradeInfoDetail.aspx?InfoId=40

5、“China in Africa oil:Guilty as charged?”, Ashild Kolas,

http://www.epsusa.org/publications/newsletter/june2007/kolas.htm

6、“China, Angola sign 9 cooperation agreements”, http://www.afrol.com/articles/15848

7、“How China is winning the oil race? ”, Jon D.Markman, Thursday 27 April 2006, http://www.truthout.org/cgi-bin/artman/exec/view.cgi/60/19484

8、“China and Angola Strengthen Bilateral Relationship”,

http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=516&language_id=1

9、“Is there a link between oil production and arms sales?”

http://formation.mepasie.org/china-makes-headway-in-angola-with-multiple-trade-ties

10、“The oil trade and cooperation between China and Africa”, 《the international economic cooperation》,

http://www.ccpit.org/Contents/Channel_1089/2008/0213/88068/content_88068.htm

11、“The rapid emergence of the oil industry in Angola”,

http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2005-02/21/content_2599445.htm

12、http://www.zgjunshi.com/Article/Class4/200803/20080302152531.html

Abstract: This paper has documented the role of the UN in promoting sustainable peace in Liberia. In this paper some aspects have been analysised such as human rights, the International Court of Justice and so on. In order to sample the current state of practice in promoting sustainable peace, I will examine the evolving roles of the UN. Particular attention will be given to the peaceful settlement of disputes, as well as to the mechanisms that each has developed to promote human rights and democracy. What’s more it has documented what has been done by UN, what it will continue to do to solve the conflicts in Liberia。

Key words: conflicts, Liberia, UN, Sustainable Peace

Following the end of the cold war, the UN did attempt to evolve an agenda for the new strategic environment. The 1992 Security Council Summit and the Secretary-General’s An Agenda for Peace outlined a set of approaches to peace. In order to sample the current state of practice in promoting sustainable peace, I will examine the evolving roles of the UN. Particular attention will be given to the peaceful settlement of disputes, as well as to the mechanisms that each has developed to promote human rights and democracy. Of course, the organization work in other areas, even in related fields, such as disarmament and development, but these will not be reviewed here. Moreover, this organization is by no means comprehensive; there are many others working on various aspects of sustainable peace whose important work is not covered here. Nonetheless, the seven that are sampled offer testimony to the wide variety of emerging approaches. Certain older mechanisms, such as the International Court of Justice, were created to settle disputes between states. Others, such as the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, are more recent innovations, developed to address disputes within states. This overview is necessarily sketchy and cannot do justice to the breadth and complexity of these organizations or the situations that they have helped to resolve ^[1].

It is also important to bear in mind the slow, complicated, and cumbersome multilateral decision-making process by which such mechanisms come into being—where member states, with differing interests, are required to agree. This tortuous process is also responsible for what has not been done. It is hoped that this overview will highlight, at least implicitly, some of the difficulties involved in designing appropriate mechanisms for sustainable peace in a multilateral world still dominated by Westphalia states and their governments, whose interests are not always perfectly aligned with those of their populations. On the more positive side, this review demonstrates that certain groups of states are increasingly able to agree on group norms and practices that can socialize governments within their collectivity into more normative and constructive behavior. The results provide hope that it may be possible to develop collective norms and procedures that can begin to promote sustainable peace. Further, exposure to approaches that are being developed elsewhere should provide a source of ideas for generating locally relevant instrumentalities ^[2].

Which UN Organ Should Have Primary Responsibility for the conflict resolution.

In order to overcome the fears that have been expressed, it is important to clarify how preventive action should be structured and which UN organ should assume primary responsibility for its implementation. Although the UN Charter gives primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security to the Security Council, in reality, the Council is not the best structure for carrying out preventive diplomacy. Although both the UN Charter and the 1988 Declaration on the Prevention and Removal of Disputes and Situations and on the Role of the United Nations in this Field urge the United Nations to become involved” early in a dispute or situation’’ or “at any stage of a dispute or situation,’’ the fact is that most disputes do not reach the Security Council’s agenda until they have escalated into armed conflict ^[3]. In other words, many disputes are not considered by the Council until it is too late for their peaceful resolution.

The major inhibiting factor is the Council’s potential range of coercive or punitive action. It is not surprising that member states are often reluctant to relinquish control over the process and outcome of their disputes to a Security Council with such powerful instruments and whose members are sometimes perceived to be pursuing their own geopolitical interests. Thus, discussions about the rights of ‘‘sovereignty’’ and concerns about”internationalizing” a dispute often mean that most states prefer to maintain control over how their disputes will be resolved, at least until such time as the situation becomes desperate ^[4].

As well, the kinds of actions that the Security Council can offer are not well suited to dispute settlement at an early stage. The notion of the Council as a kind of arbiter causes parties to engage in adversarial debate rather than problem solving. Mutual recrimination and positional arguing by each side to convince the Council of the ‘‘rightness’’ of its case may further harden positions and inflame a situation. Moreover, when Council members are forced to declare their sympathies, support for one or both sides may widen the dispute or encourage hostilities.

Moreover, the Council is so overwhelmed in its attempt to manage the many full-blown crises with which it is already seized that, even if disputes were brought to it at an early stage, it would be unlikely to add them to its agenda—even though they might well be next year’s crises.

What is needed instead is a less political and more professional approach to UN dispute resolution, which can assist member states in the implementation of Chapter VI (‘‘Pacific Settlement of Disputes’’)—by offering the right kind of acceptable assistance for resolving disputes at an early stage. As well, a parallel mechanism is needed that can focus on preventing and ameliorating the structural causes of conflict. It will be argued in chapter 13 that such programs should be developed within the UN Secretariat under the aegis of the Department of Political Affairs ^[5~7].

The Role of the International Court of Justice in Peacemaking

As the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, the International Court of Justice is designed to hear contentious cases between sovereign states and to provide advisory opinions to the authorized organs of the UN. Like the UN’s other peaceful methods for the settlement of disputes, recourse to the Court is largely voluntary. States can accept its jurisdiction in one of three ways. The first is through the ‘‘optional clause’’ (Article 36[2] of the Court’s statute). This allows member states to declare that they recognize the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, although they can also exempt certain areas from jurisdiction. The second is through the consent of a state to take a dispute to the Court as part of a special agreement or compromise (Article 36[1]). A final avenue is through compromiser clauses in treaty agreements, which stipulate that any dispute arising there from must be referred to the Court (Article 36[1]). Since there are now hundreds of such treaties, most states, in one way or another, have accepted limited jurisdiction of the Court (Rosanne, 1995) ^[8~11]. Since contentious cases brought before the Court are typically those related to the peaceful settlement of disputes between states, they will be the main focus of this discussion. Rosanne (1995) provides a description of the Court’s methodology in contentious proceedings, which is summarized below.

The Court’s Methodology in Contentious Cases

When parties agree to bring a case to the Court, an agreement is filed with the Court in which the dispute is defined and the questions that the Court is asked to decide are detailed. Alternatively, proceedings can be instituted unilaterally. In such cases, there is usually no agreement between the disputants that the case should be brought to the Court or as to what the claim is. Such an application, therefore, lists the parties, the subject of the dispute, the basis for believing that the Court has jurisdiction, the nature of the claim, and a statement of the grounds upon which the claim is based.
   When the Court’s registrar receives an application, he or she ensures that it complies with the Court’s procedural requirements, and then opens a folio in the Court’s general list. The registrar subsequently sends the application to the judges and the respondent government and contacts all members of the UN through the Secretary-General, so that they can notify the Court if they wish to intervene in the case. Finally, he or she also issues a press communiqué. If the parties have not given the case a name, it is given a “nonprejudicial” name.

Use of the Court

The Court has in the past suffered from much the same problem faced by the Security Council. On the whole, member states have been reluctant to relinquish decision-making control to a third party. Only 59 of the 185 member states of the United Nations (less than one-third) have agreed to the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction under the optional clause, and many of these have limited its jurisdiction by making exceptions. Of even greater concern, only one of the five permanent members of the Security Council (the United Kingdom) has currently endorsed the optional clause for compulsory jurisdiction.

Use of the Court has, nonetheless, grown significantly in the last few years. In1995, the Court had a record number of thirteen cases before it. Indeed, this increase in popularity has posed a problem for both the Court and those states with cases on its docket. In 1994–95, for example, the Court decided only two cases (Boutros-Ghali, 1995), although the record was much better for 1996. If member states are required to wait long periods before their case is considered, the much-welcomed increase in the use of the Court could reverse itself.

Increased use of the provision for smaller ad hoc chambers should make the Court both more attractive to member states and more efficient. This provision, which states that the judges to constitute such a chamber shall be determined by the Court, with the approval of the parties, was used for the first time in 1981 by the United States and Canada. Initially, the procedure was subject to some concern, because it essentially allows states to choose which judges will hear a case. The fear was that unrepresentative chambers could produce judgments that would not be supported by the full Court. This concern, however, has subsided, as the quality of the chambers’ decisions appears to have been maintained. The importance of the chambers provision lies in the fact that it offers another dispute settlement option to member states; this may be more acceptable to those concerned about exercising greater control, since it provides additional control over the process.

The UN’s Human Rights Machinery

In the area of human rights, the first task that the UN undertook was to set international standards for the observance of human rights and, indeed, its achievements in this area are exceptional. As Childers and Urquhart (1994) note, ‘‘If nothing more had been done in forty-five years at the United Nations than the negotiation and adoption by from 51 to 180 states of the nearly 70 instruments of the International Bill of Human Rights, this alone would fully justify the existence of the organization.’’

Regrettably, however, member states have not been as laudable with regard to their implementation. From the mid-1970s onward, the UN began to be more involved in monitoring states’ compliance with human rights and responding to violations. But the effort has too often been hindered by states’ reluctance to establish effective mechanisms for ensuring compliance, due to fears that their own human rights shortcomings might be exposed to international scrutiny or be used for political point-scoring by others.

For this and other reasons, the human rights machinery has evolved in a complex and ad hoc manner, with no overall strategic plan. In cases where political intransigence led to little being done, a new body was simply set up to do the job. Thus, the current UN human rights system is made up of a wide range of disparate bodies that often do not interact as meaningfully as they should and have overlapping mandates with different and sometimes inconsistent approaches. The most relevant of these for the advancement of sustainable peace will be briefly reviewed below ^[12].

The Human Rights Committee

Following the ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which came into force in 1976, the Human Rights Committee was established to consider reports on progress in achieving the observance of human rights by the states that had ratified or acceded to the covenant. As of July 1997, 138 states had done so (personal communication, Center for Human Rights, 1997). These states are legally bound to submit reports on the measures they have adopted in regard to legislative, judicial, and administrative matters, to give effect to the rights recognized in the covenant. The reports are examined by the 18 Human Rights Committee members, who serve in their personal capacity as human rights experts.

The committee is not a court, but it has the right to question states regarding their reports. In addition, under the First Optional Protocol of the covenant, states can recognize the competence of the committee to consider complaints from individuals against state parties regarding alleged violations of human rights. Typically, the committee meets in three sessions per year to consider these matters.

It is interesting to note that the draft covenant, which was prepared in 1954, envisioned a quasi-judicial Human Rights Committee, with considerably more power than that which was ultimately approved. By the time the Third Committee of the General Assembly debated and proposed its implementation twelve years later, the majority was opposed to making the procedure for interstate communications obligatory. The lowest common denominator was decided upon; that is, the committee’s only compulsory role would be to study and comment generally upon the reports of state parties. The functions regarding complaints were made entirely optional and those concerned with individual complaints were even separated from the covenant and placed in an optional protocol (Opsahl, 1992).

Since the Optional Protocol came into force in 1977, 716 communications concerning 51 states have been registered for consideration. Of these, the committee found violations of the covenant in 142 cases (Report of the Human Rights Committee, 1996). In the past, the committee simply submitted its findings to states, asking them to report on their compliance. There were no formal follow-up procedures. Only about half of the governments involved responded, and of these, only a little over one-fourth submitted replies that were fully satisfactory and displayed a willingness to accept the committee’s view and remedy the situation. To help overcome this problem, the committee, in 1990, established a special reporter to follow up on its findings. In 1993, the committee decided further that information on follow-up activities should be made public. In 1994, it decided that publicity should be given to responses in its annual report to the General Assembly through ‘‘a separate and highly visible’’ section and in its press communiqués ^[13~14].

A number of further problems have constrained the use of the Optional Protocol. Lack of public knowledge of the availability of the procedure and the lack of a fact-finding mechanism both weaken its effectiveness.

There is no provision for pleadings or conciliation; the only means of enforcement is the committee’s moral authority, and the pressure of public censure. Finally, the severe shortage in resources has meant that a backlog of communications has recently been accumulating ^[15].

Assistance in Human Rights

Recently, a significant effort has been made to help governments implement human rights reform by providing them with technical assistance. Although the Center for Human Rights has been active in human rights education from its inception, the formation (in 1987) of the Voluntary Fund for Technical Cooperation provided a major impetus for it to provide assistance to governments. The 1993 World Conference on Human Rights made a strong plea for this program to be strengthened and for its funding base to be expanded. As a result, the Advisory Services, Technical

Assistance and Information Branch was created.

Because of government sensitivities about interference in their internal affairs, the branch typically waits for governments to approach it before taking action, although some countries are also referred by the Human Rights Commission, the Human Rights Committees, or special rapporteurs. Once a government has approached the branch, a field visit is carried out by one or more experts who assess the human rights needs of the country through in-depth discussion with a range of interlocutors. The team collects and studies copies of the country’s constitutions and laws. In some cases, it recommends that assistance begin with a small, discreet initiative; in others, it recommends a comprehensive ‘‘country program.’’ A legal agreement is then signed to ensure that the parties are willing to follow through on the proposed program.

For countries in transition, the branch can provide constitutional assistance through the advisory service of experts, through conferences and seminars, or simply by making relevant documents available. Advice may be offered on drafting legislation, constitutions, or bills of rights. In order to bring national laws into conformity with international standards, experts and specialized staff are available to assist governments in the reform of legislation related to human rights and fundamental freedoms. Commentary on drafts is provided and recommendations are made, which include comparative reference to similar laws in other jurisdictions.

In addition, the branch has been involved in the training of judges, magistrates, lawyers, prosecutors, police officers, and prison personnel. It also plans to begin training armed forces regarding human rights. It provides training and an advisory service to parliamentarians on national human rights legislation, parliamentary human rights committees, and the role of parliament in promoting and protecting human rights. The branch also offers its services to governments considering or in the process of establishing national human rights institutions, including financial assistance, training and assistance in the drafting of reports to United Nations treaty bodies, and training on the effective investigation of human rights violations.

The service has recently introduced courses for media professionals on topics such as the situation of the press, public perceptions of human rights through television, access to information, the problems of censorship, the role of the press in the development of a pluralistic society, and obstacles to human rights reporting. A range of training initiatives has been established for primary, secondary, and tertiary students, aimed at assisting in the building of a human rights culture. Finally, the branch translates documentation into local languages, assists in the computerization of national and regional human rights offices, and provides support to national libraries as well as to national or regional human rights documentation centers ^[16].

Although this new approach is exceedingly promising, the sharp increase in demand has already caused a critical shortage of resources, both in terms of staff and finances. The branch has 27 project officers, and its director estimates that it needs twice that number to adequately meet recent requests.

Possible Next Steps

Since the end of the cold war, progress has been made in the areas of peacemaking through the increased use of good offices under the auspices of the Secretary-General and the personal representatives as well as the International Court of Justice. Progress has also been made in the area of offering assistance in human rights and electoral assistance. This now needs to be systematically built upon. Some possible next steps will be briefly outlined below ^[17].

The International Court of Justice

Until recently, much of the debate about improving the International Court of Justice as an option for dispute settlement has focused on how to expand its jurisdiction. However, the increased use of the Court (which has occurred naturally with the end of the cold war) has highlighted the need to streamline its procedures so that it can operate more efficiently. The ability to hear more than one case at a time and the increased use of smaller ad hoc chambers could assist in this regard.

In terms of enhancing its general dispute settlement functions, the authority to seek an advisory opinion could also be extended to the Secretary- General. This authority could be granted by the General Assembly, and would allow the Secretary-General (in the process of carrying out good offices) to submit the legal aspects of a case at an early stage for an opinion of the Court. It would assist in preventive diplomacy by providing not only an objective opinion, but also a cooling off period, while the Court deliberated. To work in this way, however, the Court would have to develop” fast-track procedures.’’ The Commission on Global Governance (1995) has also suggested that fast-track procedures might encourage the Security Council to use the Court more often for advisory opinions.

The Court continues to play an important role in the international system through modeling a process of reason, whereby disputes can be settled through recourse to international law. However, because it is limited to interstate disputes, it cannot offer assistance with intrastate problems ^[18].

Human Rights

Establishing appropriate mechanisms for the monitoring and protecting of human rights has also been a difficult task for the UN, since human rights became yet another battleground of the cold war, with considerable time spent on airing and debating ideological differences between East and West. Because of the varying views on the topic, the UN’s human rights bodies were often forced to take a minimalist approach. Ambivalence about human rights also resulted in the whole area being badly under funded, with less than 1 percent of the UN regular budget currently being allocated for human rights. Nonetheless, with the end of the cold war, several of the human rights bodies have been freed, at least in part, to pursue their mandates more vigorously, and some recent progress in adopting more satisfactory procedures has been made, as noted in the above discussion.

It is clear, nonetheless, that the whole domain of human rights needs much more attention. Of overriding importance is the need to prevent human rights abuses. An improved and enlarged program for technical assistance in human rights would be useful in this regard. It might also be helpful to relate the human rights and political sections of the organization more closely. Even now, there is very little contact between the two. The presence of human rights experts as part of regional centers could provide a much-needed link between the Department of Political Affairs and the

Center for Human Rights and allow preventive diplomacy teams to have ready access to human rights expertise and vice versa. With regard to both prevention and protection, the appointment of a High Commissioner for Human Rights is a major step forward. The use of human rights observers and field operations and offices may turn out to be another important approach ^[19].

The years 1995 to 2004 represent the United Nations Decade for Human Rights Education as well as the International Decade of the World’s Indigenous People, and 1998 is the fiftieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration. These offer further opportunity for the international community to strengthen and support work in this vital field ^[20],[11].

The Report of the United States Commission on Improving the Effectiveness of the United Nations (1994) has also called for the establishment of an international human rights court, to hear human rights cases. It suggested that such a court could be modeled after the European and Inter-American human rights courts, to have jurisdiction over human rights treaties, although its authority could not be invoked until all domestic remedies had been exhausted.

Summary

One of the major factors still interfering with the UN’s ability to function effectively in the area of prevention is its crisis orientation. By focusing most of its energies on this end of the continuum, it often intervenes at a time when it is least likely to be effective. Its limited resources are then sucked into a few situations that seem to closely resemble black holes. Efforts to prevent tomorrow’s crises are neglected as the organization struggles to cope with today’s tragedies. As a result, conflicts that might have been prevented then emerge to occupy the organization’s resources and distract it further from prevention. Thus, a major shift in emphasis toward prevention will be needed if the organization is to become more effective. Chapters 13 and 14 will outline some ways in which this could be done.

R e f e r e n c e s

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[3]1993. A new regional order in South-East Asia: ASEAN in the post-cold war era. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies.

[4]1994a. ASEAN-UN cooperation in peace and preventive diplomacy: Its contribution to regional security. The Indonesian Quarterly 22, no. 3:215–26.

[5]1994b. Human rights and regional order: ASEAN and human rights management in post-cold war Southeast Asia. In ASEAN and Human Rights Management in Southeast Asia, ed. J. T. H. Tang. London: Cassell Publishers.

[6]Adeniji, O. 1993. Regionalism in Africa. Security Dialogue 24:211–20.

[7]af Ugglas, M. 1993. The challenge of preventive diplomacy: The experience of the

CSCE. Stockholm, Sweden: Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

[8]Alagappa, M. 1993. Regionalism and the quest for security: ASEAN and the Cambodian conflict. Journal of International Affairs 46, no. 2:439–67.

[9]Almond, H. H. 1993. Human rights, international humanitarian law, and the

peaceable adjustment of differences in Africa. East Africa Journal of Peace and

Human Rights 1, no. 2:137–63.

[10]Alston, P. 1992a. Critical appraisal of the UN human rights regime. In The United Nations and human rights, ed. P. Alston. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

[11]1992b. The Commission on Human Rights. In The United Nations and human rights, ed. P. Alston. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

[12]1992c. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. In The

United Nations and human rights, ed. P. Alston. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

[13]Amoah, P. 1992. The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights—An effective weapon for human rights? The African Journal of International and Comparative Law 4:226–40.

[14]Amoo, S. G. 1993. Role of the OAU: Past, present, and future. In Making war and waging peace, ed. D. Smock. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press.

[15] Arat, Z. F. 1991. Democracy and human rights in developing countries. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

[16] Archibugi, D. 1993. The reform of the UN and cosmopolitan democracy: A criticalreview. Journal of Peace Research 30:301–16.

[17] Askandar, K. 1994. ASEAN and conflict management: The formative years of 1967–1976. Pacifica Review: Peace, Security and Global Change 6:43–56.

[18] Bakwesegha, C. J. 1993. The need to strengthen regional organizations: A rejoinder.Security Dialogue 24, no. 4:377–81.

[19] Bercovitch, J., and J. Langley. 1993. The nature of the dispute and the effectiveness of international mediation. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 37,670–91.

[20 Berhe-Tesfu, C. 1995. Humanitarian action, preventive diplomacy and advocacy: The emerging role of CBOs and NGOs. International   Journal  of  Refugee  Law Special Edition, 220–34.

Research paper supervisor:Dr.Seku Conde

Minzu University of China

2007-2008 Academic Year

Abstract

The Kashmir issue is the key of the India-Pakistan military conflict as well as the unrest in South Asia over the period of more than half a century. Recently, affecting by many factors India and Pakistan put forward series of reconciliation proposals so that the strains of India and Pakistan are easing. However, due to the complexity of history and reality, whether the Kashmir issue can be resolved eventually; whether the military conflict of this area can end and whether the moderation of India-Pakistan relations can continue, cannot reach an optimistic conclusion yet.

In this paper the writer will first put forward that the Kashmir issue is the prominent factor to influence the India and Pakistan relations and then analyze how this can happen from five aspects. In the second half of the paper, writer will analyze why the India and Pakistan relations became better since the “9.11” attacks from six aspects.

Key words: India-Pakistan relations; Kashmir issue; regional security; interests of big powers; anti-terrorism

Introduction

More than half a century, the Kashmir issue has always been the core of India-Pakistan relations. It is the main reason leading to the constant military conflicts and the frequent cross-border terrorist activities between India and Pakistan. Moreover, it is an important factor for the instability in South Asia. In the past 10 years, because of the Kashmir issue tens of thousands of people were killed by serious violence between India and Pakistan. Exchange of fire almost happened every day in this region by the India and Pakistan armies, in addition, cross-border terrorist activities frequently occurred. In recent years, especially after the terrorist attacks on Indian parliament in December 2001, the India-Pakistan relations tensed again; almost came to the brink of all-out war. Since 2003, subject to various factors, India and Pakistan have actively put forward a series of reconciliation proposals to improve relations and thus the India-Pakistan relations have started to become relaxed. In November 2003 following an appeal by Pakistan, two sides signed a cease-fire agreement on the 25th and it entered into force on the same day. The event stated clear the improvement of bilateral relations become a reality. After that, in January 2004, the leaders of the two countries conducted their first meeting since two years in the 12th SAARC Summit, and decided to start Talks from the beginning of February, on the Jammu, Kashmir and other major issues.

Achieving a comprehensive ceasefire in Kashmir and an improvement of relations between India and Pakistan are the first glimmer of the dawn to the peace and stability in South Asia. At the same time, whether the military conflict in Kashmir can end for ever, whether the cross-border terrorist activities can be reduced, whether the relaxation of India-Pakistan relations can continue, whether the Kashmir issue can be properly resolved eventually, it is difficult to draw an optimistic conclusion. But it is certain that the Kashmir issue is still the core of the prospects for India-Pakistan relations. The direction of India and Pakistan relations is the important factor to influence the peace and stability in South Asia.

Chapter 1 Kashmir issue is the core of India-Pakistan relations

Since the 9-11 attacks, the global terrorist activities became more rampant, therefore, the United Nations and the Security Council went through a series of anti-terrorism resolutions, and the international community intensified the anti-terrorism efforts. With the spread of terrorist activities and the fight against terrorism in a worldwide scale, the regional issues became more prominent. Among them, in South Asia, Kashmir military conflicts and cross-border terrorist activities warmed up; instable factors were increasing, the security of South Asia trended to be more deteriorating several times. With the arising and subsiding of the India-Pakistan conflicts, Kashmir conflict and terrorist violence between India and Pakistan focused the attention of the international community for a period of time; meanwhile the security in South Asia also affected the development and changes on international relations in all aspects. The root of India-Pakistan crisis is not only caused by transnational terrorism, but also by the ascription of Kashmir. The current difference on Kashmir issue between India and Pakistan is not only a historical continuation, but also a reflection of reality.

Kashmir issue is a historic issue since India and Pakistan have been divided in 1947. The India-Pakistan partition was in accordance with the "Mountbatten Programme". After then, the India-Pakistan dispute on Kashmir has extended more than half a century. Meanwhile, two of the three large-scale wars between India and Pakistan broken out on the Kashmir issue, and the small-scale armed conflicts in the region continued. In May 1999, India and Pakistan out broke a fierce armed conflict which lasted for two months in Kashmir. The two sides used heavy weapons such as military aircraft. The number of dead and injured nearly reached 1,000. The military conflict almost led to the fourth Large-scale India-Pakistan war. In 1999 after the end of India and Pakistan armed conflict, the exchange of fire between India and Pakistan in Kashmir has never stopped. The air of tensions could not be eased. Therefore, the Kashmir issue on the point of both the history and reality has always been the major sticking point for the long-term tension and military confrontation between India and Pakistan. It is the root of India-Pakistan conflict.

For a long time, the international community as well as India and Pakistan have carried out several attempts to resolve the Kashmir issue, but it is always difficult to find the final solution. The Kashmir issue is difficult to solve, mainly because of the following reasons:

 (1) The intricate and complicated problem of ethnic groups and religion

Among the 130,000,000 population of Kashmir[①], 77% are Muslims (see table 1); 20% are Hindus and the rest are Sikhs and Buddhists. Since the partition of India and Pakistan, Muslims in India Kashmir have launched anti-India armed struggles time and again in order to get rid of India’s control. Extremist groups who advocate the independence of Kashmir have never ceased terrorist activities.

Table 1 the percentage of Muslin population in the districts of Kashmir (according to the 1941 census)

*The “controlled by” data in the above table is based on who controls more of the district as some districts are divided by the Line of Control. For example, more than half of the Punch district is controlled by Pakistan but the town of Punch is on the Indian side of the line of control.

 (2) The important strategic position of Kashmir

Kashmir situated in the north of South Asia Subcontinent, is the strategic region for India and Pakistan. For India, it can reduce the so called “threaten” from the east and prevent the spread of Islamic power from the west; for Pakistan, Kashmir is considered as the important defensive line of national security. Because of the often conflicting interests, India and Pakistan cannot arrive at a compromise on Kashmir issue regarding the national security and diplomatic strategy.

(3) The deep difference of India and Pakistan on Kashmir issue

India and Pakistan have deep difference on the ascription of Kashmir. On one hand Pakistan holds that Hindus and Muslims are different nations. If Kashmir where Muslims are in the majority belongs to India, the integrity of Pakistan as an independent Islam country will vanish. On the other hand India maintains that although Hindus and Muslims believe in different religions, they are still one nation, so that it opposes to the idea that Muslims set up their own country according to religious belief[②] and it insists on one nation theory[③]. Meanwhile, since India is a fascinating country where people of many different communities and religions live together in unity, it guards against the tendency to put Kashmir issue internationally because it worries that the intervention of international society may lead India to Balkanization[④].

 (4) The rampant regional terrorist activities

In recent years, extremist Islam groups proposing Kashmir independence were active in this area. They made many terrorist attacks so that the controversy of India and Pakistan on Kashmir became more and more serious. After the Afghan war, affected by the international and regional terrorist activities, the India-Pakistan situation tended to be severer and it could be deteriorating even further. Large-scaled conflicts or wars between India and Pakistan may break out at any time; internal turmoil also may happen. All the possibility brings new unstable factors to the security situation in South Asia.

(5) The mood of ethnicity and religion is out of control

The dispute by ethnicity and religion in Kashmir lasts over half a century, all kinds of conflicts are complicated and difficult to deal with, and many problems can be controlled by neither Indian nor Pakistan government. Kashmir has witnessed several wars on the ascription issue. The mood of ethnicity and religion is innate and lasting. Both India and Pakistan governments have tried many times to prevent the terrorist activities from this area, but they are still rampant, which to some extend indicates that India and Pakistan lost control in Kashmir on some issues.

Chapter 2 The main reasons for the moderation of India-Pakistan relations

Over the years, India-Pakistan relations were complex and changeable due to the Kashmir issue and intensified terrorist activities. Although India and Pakistan have had several attempts to improve relations, all the effort failed in the end because of the serious differences on Kashmir issue and anti-terrorism. The moderation of India and Pakistan relations shows that under the continuous unrest of the international circumstances the two countries are adjusting their diplomatic policies according to the international and regional situations, and the moderation of bilateral relations is taken as the most important one.

Since 20O3, the two sides in accordance with the needs of regional and international development brew their own programmes to improve relations between the two countries; they made a number of easing tensions solutions and regional peace proposals in Kashmir. In particular, in January 2004 the 12th Summit of SAARC held in the Pakistani capital Islamabad has provided an opportunity for the further improvement of India-Pakistan relations. In February 2OO4, in order to achieve the normalization of relations India and Pakistan re-opened a further process of political dialogue. This showed the two sides’ sincerity to improve bilateral relations and the desire to achieve peace in the region. The improvement of India and Pakistan relations does not only conform to the fundamental interests of the people from the two countries; it is not only conducive to the peace, stability and development of South Asian region, but it is also widely praised by the international community. Therefore, to improve India-Pakistan relations and implement the ceasefire in Kashmir is the needs of the current domestic and foreign affairs of India and Pakistan as well as the needs for counter-terrorism situation and the maintenance of the South Asian regional security.

(1) The need of internal and foreign affairs 

For internal affairs and diplomatic considerations, the two countries need to ease India-Pakistan bilateral relations, in particular the Kashmir cease-fire. As a big country, India has material effect on the international society especially in Asia. Since the end of the Cold War, India has all along taken the development of high technology and improvement of the comprehensive national strength as the core of the national strategy. It strived to consolidate dominant position in South Asia and the Indian Ocean in order to develop from a regional big power to one of the "world powers" in the international stage. However, so far, India has not only failed to achieve the long-cherished wish- the “big power strategy”[⑤], but also the hope is very frail. First of all, to achieve the "big power strategy" must have a solid economic foundation. However, because of the long-term tension between India and Pakistan, Kashmir is the scene of frequent wars and invasions. India’s military expenditure is on the constantly expanding and it does not have sufficient financial and material resources to develop the economy so that it lost the necessary conditions to achieve the “big power strategy ". Secondly, to become a global power, India's foreign strategy cannot be confined to the South Asian region. Going out of the South Asia is based on the need to safeguard regional security. The South Asian regional security has always been the lack of protection because of the long-term tension between India and Pakistan as well as the military confrontation in Kashmir so India's external development strategy is difficult to carry out. In conclusion, only if the India-Pakistan relations can be well dealt with, the Kashmir cease-fire can be realized and the regional security in South Asia can be protected, can India carry out “the big power strategy” step by step ".

For Pakistan, improving relations with India and achieving a ceasefire in Kashmir are the needs of its internal and external security. For a long time, the war neighboring Pakistan has never ceased, particularly after the war against the former Soviet Union who invaded Afghanistan, and the anti-terrorism war in Afghanistan after the "9 • 11" attacks in the United States, as well as the long-term war in Kashmir with India, the nation power of Pakistan has been increasingly weaker and the economic development has been constrained. Coupled with the continuous dispute over the domestic political forces and the further deepening conflicts among various religions, the instable factors continued to increase in the society. In foreign relations, since Pakistan is in a special position in the war against terrorism, the direction of its foreign policy will definitely affect the normal development of its foreign relations. To free itself from the problems facing at home and abroad, Pakistan is crying for a ceasefire in Kashmir.

 (2) The need of regional security and anti-terrorism

The South Asian area takes an important role in the international anti-terrorism strategy; and it is also the breeding ground for terrorist forces, therefore, the ceasefire in Kashmir and the improvement of India and Pakistan relations are the need of regional security as well as the need of the current international anti-terrorism activities. India and Pakistan crisis is further exacerbated after the Afghan war, and it has a serious impact on the security situation in South Asia, it is even possible to affect the Asia-Pacific regional security situation with the proliferation of the crisis. In 2003, with the outbreak of the Iraq War and the further complicated situation in Middle East after the war, as well as the sharp increase of international terrorist activities, the international anti-terrorism situation was very grim. At the same time, the South Asian regional security has been seriously threatened by the proliferation of terrorism, so that the counter-terrorism situation was also in the same grave. In order to improve the regional security situation and further fight against terrorism, achieving the Kashmir ceasefire and improving India and Pakistan relations are closely linked to the anti-terrorism wars launching by the western countries after the “9.11” attacks.

 (3) The need of big powers’ interests

On the point of geopolitics, South Asia is the intersection of big powers’ interests, therefore, the regional security of South Asia and the change of India and Pakistan relations involve the national strategy and security interests of big powers. For the United States, the increase of India and Pakistan dispute affects not only the current U.S. counter-terrorism strategy launching in the South Asian region, but also affects the implementation of U.S. global anti-terrorism strategy; for China, the turbulence in South Asia has a direct impact on China's western border security; For Russia, as the South Asian region links to Central Asia which is Russia's traditional sphere of influence, so the South Asia security relates to the firmness of Russia’s strategic position in Central Asia; for Japan, the Indian Ocean is an important sea channel access to energy; for Europe in particular for the United Kingdom and France, South Asia has political, economic and military ties with them in tradition. The South Asia region is closely related to the economic, political and national strategic interests of every big power. However, the worsening of India and Pakistan relations doesn’t only threaten the South Asia’s regional security, but also will influence the strategic and security interests of big powers. Thus, on the angle of strategy and security, big powers or groups of big power all effect on the reconciliation between the two countries. The improvement and normalization of India and Pakistan relations conform to the interests and needs of big powers. Meanwhile, big powers play an important role in coordination and promotion of India and Pakistan relations.

 (4) The need of external relations’ adjustment

In recent years, with the deepening of international wars on terrorism launching by the United States, the international relations have also undergone a new change, as well as the big-power relations have carried out a major adjustment in the new international situation. Under the influence of the changes both India and Pakistan deepen the sense of crisis. It forces the two countries to face up to reality and re-adjust their foreign policies. Aware of both India and Pakistan, only to ease bilateral relations and resolve the Kashmir dispute can eliminate the threat from the outside world to the South Asian region and safeguard regional security. To this end, India and Pakistan also took the advantage of the United States’ need on anti-terrorism to get close to the United States. They hoped to improve and strengthen relations with the United States by providing anti-terrorism help, so that they could use U.S. forces to suppress the counterpart; taking a favorable position in the bilateral negotiations; getting out of the plight of domestic and foreign affairs. In order to strengthen the relations with big powers, India and Pakistan are active in developing diplomacy with all the big powers and the Groups. They established new systems of bilateral relations With the United States[⑥], Russia[⑦], Japan[⑧], the EU[⑨], China[⑩] and other countries. In 20O3, Indian Prime Minister also met with the leaders of the United States, China, Russia and the EU. The meetings did not only further narrow the gap between the United States and the EU, but also consolidated the traditional relations with Russia, and it was more prominent to make new breakthroughs with China. In recent years India has also strengthened the ASEAN, Japan and South Korea relations, the association continued to increase. India's strategies to the East (ASEAN), the South (the Indian Ocean), the North (Central Asia and Afghanistan) and the West (Iran and Israel) have made new progress in its international image and International status. Therefore, in order to further establish its image in the international community, it is important to improve relations with Pakistan. Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf was also running around the United States, China and Europe. He sought support from the big powers and the Groups on India-Pakistan relations and regional issues to strive for initiative for peace in the region.

 (5) The need of economic development of India and Pakistan

India and Pakistan's long-term hostility and military confrontation in Kashmir bring huge economic losses to the two countries, so it forces them to speed up the improvement of their relations. Because of the long-term military confrontation between the two countries, they do not only damage their own international images seriously, but also hinder the foreign investors for the area. At the same time, the two countries put considerable human and financial resources[11] in Kashmir, so that the two sides have to carry a heavy economic burden. It will not do any good on the national strategic interests of both the countries. In addition, since they have severed bilateral trade and transport, the two countries suffered huge economic losses. Only in the aviation industry, the two sides since the end of 2001 when prohibited the other side of the aircraft flying over its airspace, the airlines had to bypass their excursion. The annual economic losses of the Indian Airlines amounted to nearly 5 million U.S. dollars while Pakistan lost 1.5 million Dollars.

In addition, the international political situation has a major change; the economic globalization has a further development; the regional economic cooperation has become increasingly active. India and Pakistan also hope to revitalize the "SAARC" and expand its impact. While both India and Pakistan holds an important position in South Asia, only if the two countries eliminate barriers and cooperate sincerely, can be "SAARC" likely to play an active role. To this end, Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee called for "SAARC" Member States to strengthen mutual co-operations, seize all opportunities to strengthen mutual co-operations and national economy.[12] He made a speech at the opening of the 12th SAARC in January 2004 and said, "We must take bold action to change suspicion into trust; differences into coordination; conflict into peace." During the meeting the Pakistani President, Musharraf also said, "We need to unload the historical burdens - distrust, pain and tension", "otherwise the SAARC will never be able to fully play its role and achieve its objectives."[13] This reaction, on the one hand shows Pakistan’s strong desire to further ease its relations with India. And on the other hand it also shows that Pakistan's attention for the future development of SAARC. Since its establishment in 1985, the development of SAARC was difficult because of the tension between India and Pakistan in large measure, so that it did not play its due role. In today's international political and economic situation, India and Pakistan are all aware of the importance of regional cooperation. Sense of urgency and crisis force the leaders of both India and Pakistan to take decisive actions for the development prospects of regional cooperation. Its purpose is not only to further promote the improvement of relations between India and Pakistan, but also to create good conditions for the future development of SAARC; promoting the long-term strategy of SAARC; achieving peace and stability in South Asian region; creating harmonious atmosphere for the internal cooperation of SAARC.

 (6) Kashmir people desire peace

In Kashmir, not only the India and Pakistan governments have the wish to end the military confrontation earlier, but also the people of Kashmir have been looking forward to peace. Due to the long-term wars in Kashmir, many local families are broken up by the containment lines between India and Pakistan; many people are forced to leave their hometown. Wars have brought immense suffering to people in Kashmir. When the November 2003 ceasefire agreement came into effect, families isolated in Kashmir where was controlled by India and Pakistan during the war came together without previous arrangement. It fully expressed people’s desire to achieve regional peace, and their hope for an early reunion of families. They hoped that no wars in return in Kashmir and peace can last forever. At present, from the objective of peace and stability in South Asia, the conflict of the two sides only can be solved through dialogue. The issues left over by history including the Kashmir dispute, should be resolved through a fair and rational way, or else the conflict between India Pakistan will be never-ending, South Asia regional peace and stability are also difficult to protect. Therefore, to ease India-Pakistan relations and to cease fire in Kashmir is not only the result considering to a variety of factors and the development situation of India and Pakistan, but also the result of people’s yearning for peace.

Conclusion

For the current situation, India and Pakistan signed the Kashmir cease fire agreement and launched further talks including the Kashmir issue on February 2004; the India-Pakistan relations had a little bit of twist. However, whether the India-Pakistan relations can ease continuously, the ultimate resolution of the Kashmir issue is the key. The reason is that the root of India and Pakistan problem always focuses on the crisis in Kashmir. The Kashmir issue is very complicated and sensitive; it includes both ethnic and religious issues as well as the issue of national interest. It is not only historical issues but also closely affects the reality. In addition, the difficulty of resolving the Kashmir issue is also related to the various positions of big powers on India Pakistan and Kashmir issue. Their willingness and interest should be reflected in the resolution on the Kashmir issue. On the other hand, despite the Kashmir issue can hardly be resolved in short term, the serious differences between India and Pakistan has a long history and can not be completely eliminated. The recurrence of terrorist incidents and the possibility of military conflict will arise, the India-Pakistan relations are still fragile, and it is inevitable to be repeated. But cease-fire in Kashmir and further talks, after all, shows that both sides desire peace so that people can see the hope for peace. It has a positive effect on the promotion of South Asian regional peace and stability. In short, to resolve the Kashmir issue and the development of relations between India and Pakistan, also needs a long-term and arduous process. The way to resolve the Kashmir issue needs India and Pakistan to bury the hatchet, and consider the overall situation of regional security in South Asia through peaceful means and dialogue, and to promote stable and normal development of India-Pakistan relations.

References

[1] Copland: India Problem, 北新书局, 1927.

[2] Nehru: the Discovery of India, World Affair Press, 1956.

[3] Sisir Gupta, “Issues and Prospects in Kashmir”, in Verinder Grover(ed), International Relations and Foreign Policy of India, Vol2 “India’s Neighbors and Her Foreign Policy”, New Delhi, Deep & Deep Publications, 1992.

[4] R. Mohan: “the United States and India-Pakistan Relations”, Hindu, 2001/9/20

[5] Amit Baruah and B. Muralidhar Reddy, Vajpayee, “Musharraf hope peace process will continue”, The Hindu, January 6, 2004.

[6]刘艺：南亚地区合作的推进器——评第十二届南盟首脑会议，当代亚太，2004（2）。

[7]普京访印——规划双边战略伙伴关系，文汇报，2000年10月3日，第二版。

[8]瓦杰帕伊访华和中印关系新局面，亚太经济时报，2003年6月28日，第A07版。

[9] The SAARC Council of News Ministers on November 11, 2003.

[10] http://military.china.com/zh_cn/news2/569/20010301/128831.html

[11] http://www.pakalert.net/articles/demodate_kashmir.asp

[12] http://www.zackvision.com/weblog/2003/09/kashmir-religion.html

Acknowledgements

First of all, I would like to give my sincere gratitude to my teacher Seku for his enlightens. He taught me to think independently and face the difficulties. He is a strict teacher so for a period of time I did not like him, but he surely led me to the right way of creating the thesis. Thank him for his kindness and patience.

    Meanwhile, my thanks go to my dearest classmates. From them I learnt the appropriate altitude towards study and life.

The relationships between china and socialist countries, in fact, are relations that China contacts with china –communist countries. They all use action to prove the achievements of Marx's theory of socialism. In the process of fulfilling its theoretical achievements in the light of each own condition, there are not only mutual helps and interdependence between them, but also cooperation and reciprocity and more conflict. Even they confront the pressure of “West world”, which is dominated by American.

It is 87 years since China have accepted Marx's theory of socialism and have put it into practice. The relationship between china –communist countries can also be divided into three phases of this interaction process in these years. Namely, the first phase is from 1921 to 1949, it explains how the Communist Party of China sprouted, developed, grew, and even had the strength to establish its political power under the help of Russia. The second phase is from 1949 to 1989, it discusses the relationship of the socialist countries, especially of Soviet Union which is the leader of the socialist bloc. The third phase is from 1989 to 2008, it elaborates the relationship between the only a few socialist countries after the changes in the world, which is the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

1) China was nearly full depended on Soviet Union (1921-1949）

Underling the help of Soviet Union, Communist Party of China (CPC) established the People’s Republic of China. Through analyzing the history of the establishment of CPC, we could know that China nearly full depended on Soviet Union at this period.

Founding of CPC showed that CPC initiated the beginning to accept the friendly assistant from outside. The Communist party of Soviet Union which was lead by Lenin founded the political power in 1917 as the October Revolution breaking out; the first socialist country was born in the word. CPC was founded according the tide of the history in1921 and grew up increasingly. At the beginning stage of CPC, Soviet Union and International Communist Party gave their selfless support to CPC.

Sometimes, it was not a good idea to completely copy others. The CPC incurred failure when copying the model of Russia revolution. At the starting of Chinese revolution, CPC made many mistakes as the Wang Ming was the leader of it. At that time, most of the top leaders of CPC had the background of oversea learning, mainly studying in Russia. They copied the model of Russia revolution without abiding by the reality of China, So CPC suffered heavy casualties from the Kuomintang (KMT) government (Republic of China) which was led by Chiang Kaishek and mainly supported by U.S.

Only if from pure copy others struggling model to forming its own model, could one be increasingly mature. Though the failure, CPC got the lesson and experience. They elected new leader, Mao Tse-Tung, to direct the CPC after the Zunyi Meeting in 1935. CPC experienced “the Long March” and carried out the new revolution policy which was “struggling from rural area to city “.They refused some policies which were provided by the Communist Party of Soviet Union and International Communist Party and laid down the road of revolution which was suited its own according the reality. So CPC defeated KMT and made the success of revolution

Establishing New China of CPC got the help of Soviet Union, while underwent the pressure of America, the No.1 of the West bloc. On February 4, 1949, the policy to China of America claimed by President Harry S. Truman:” it will keep the flexibility of facing Chinese policy, and avoid chaining into one administrative route and one party. China should follow other region to China when considering the sequence.”[1]

Thank to the “containment” of America, China only full depended on Soviet Union to sprout, develop, grow, and even had the strength to establish its political power.

2)China was from full dependent on Soviet Union to the semi-independent on Soviet Union and went toward independent（1949-1989）

Although CPC was strong after 28 yeas struggling and made the victory of the revolution, but they lacked experience in socialist construction with Marx's theory, they had to continue to study from Soviet Union and the Soviet Communist Party and to obtain Stalin's guidance and help, in addition, the West bloc which was dominated by American had malicious intentions to divide the socialist countries. Because of the situation of that time, China had to from full depend on Soviet Union before 1949 to semi-depend on Soviet Union at 1950s, go toward independent at 1960s, and obtain the full independent at last.

a) Main diplomatic policy

Since People’s Republic of China had founded on October 1, 1949, it begun to purse the independent diplomatic policy which was the rudiment of Chinese diplomacy, i.e. “the Five Principle of Peaceful Coexistence”. This fundamental diplomatic policy was put forward by Premier Zhou enlai on December 31, 1953 when receiving the deputation of India. It was the sole of Chinese contact with other countries, whenever the social system and ideology.

At the same time; China practiced three main diplomatic policies to maintain the relation with socialist camp and other countries, especially to Soviet Union, the leader of the socialist camp and the important neighbor of north China.

These three main diplomatic policies respectively were the “standing by one side”, “inviting the guests after sweeping the house”, and “reopening a new cooking stove”. These foreign policies clearly answered the issues after the birth of New China. That was, how to proceed with the establishment of its diplomatic relations; how to deal with the relations of United States and other imperialist, and how to treat the Soviet Union and Eastern European socialist countries. It was in accordance with the reality at that time, and embodied the fundamental interests of China about how to achieve the aim which was country's full independence and maintaining of world peace.

The meaning of” Standing by one side” was brilliantly explained by Mao Tse-Tung, the first chairman of New China. “Standing by one side”, he said, is the experiment and the lesson which is summarized by 40 years of Sun Yatsen and 28 years of CPC. We deeply know that if we want to get the victory and strengthen the victory, we must stand by one side. Chinese people either choose to the road of imperialism, or choose to the road of socialism, there is no third way. We not only oppose the bang of Chiang Kaishek which is on behalf of the imperialism, but also the illusion of the third road.”

The” standing by one side” diplomatic policy was that China decided to support the Soviet Union camp, which represented peace and democracy in that time, while against the policy of invader and war which was implemented by imperialism, so China could safeguard the world peace and promote the progress of human being.[2]

“Inviting the guests after sweeping the houses”, Chairman Mao also gave it a specific explication:” our country is too dirty if we look it as a family. there are firewood, garbage, dust, fleas, bedbugs, lice and so on, After the liberation (1949), we need to clean up our house, from inside to outside, from all corners of the house to its windows and doors. We must sweep out the dirty from it and have a tidying, clean, and order of all things, then we will invite the guests come in our room.”

The so-called “reopen a new cooking stove” is to cut the link of China's diplomatic history of humiliation which is nearly maintain a hundred years old. The People’s Republic of China does not recognize any diplomatic relations of foreign governments which are established of the KMT government. It must establish a new diplomatic relations basing on the new conditions[3]

b) Semi-depending on Soviet Union

According to these three main diplomatic policy, China and Soviet Union use action to prove the achievements of Marx's theory of socialism. In the process of fulfilling its theoretical achievements in the light of each own condition, there are not only mutual helps and interdependence between them, but also cooperation and reciprocity and more conflict. It may be divided three periods when china contacted with Soviet Union from 1949 to 1989.

First, it was the “honeymoon period” with Soviet Union at 1950s. In some sense, this “honeymoon period”, in fact, was a result which was from full dependence on the Soviet Communist Party and the Soviet Union which New China closely followed to semi-dependence on it.

December 1949 to February 1950, the new leader of Chinese Chairman Mao Tse-Tung, and Premier Zhou Enlai went to visit the Soviet Union, and talked with Soviet leader Stalin, the follower of Lenin. Meanwhile, the both parties involved signed a serials agreement which benefited to each other and established a formal alliance, such as the "Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance Mutual Aid", "on Changchun Railway, Lushunkou and Dalian agreement of China". Since then, bilateral economic and trade relations of two sides had developed rapidly. Soviet Union gave a large-scale assistance for economic and cultural development of New China. From 1950 to 1954, one of the most prominent was the total assistance of 156 key construction projects in Chinese development.[4] Also, there were the political, economic, military and cultural relations, which were in line with the "honeymoon period".

In the "honeymoon period", despite there were some "contradictions" and "friction", but it is only involved in dealing with bilateral relations encountered in a number of specific issues, it was no talk about the theory, policies and ideological issues. The two parties maintained consistency in ideological aspect and there were hardly any "differences." They kept a "high degree of agreement" and pursed Marxism-Leninism as the guide to practice the socialist and communist ideology.

Although sometimes the leaders of two countries had privately complained about each other, Mao criticized Stalin had the idea of chauvinism and practiced the road which was “incompatible with Marxism”. Even Mao said:” there are real friends and false one when contacting with each other. Real friends are sympathy, support and help, and are sincere friendship, the false one is kindness on the surface, they provided with some bad idea and induce people to be deceived, and then they did nothing standing by side with a smile. We have to guard against the behavior”. But in international community, the two sides kept a voice and take common policy. What was worth mentioning was it has never arrived at the high point of "ideological differences", let alone openly criticized each other.

In fact, this is not surprising. In the process of Chinese revolution, CPC had obtained guidance and assistance of the Communists Party of Soviet Union and the Stalin's government, the Chinese communists, including Mao, had always claimed to be the Stalin's students. Because of this, the Chinese communists at that time, also as in the past, in some extent, trended to the Soviet Communist Party, the Soviet Union, and Stalin's superstition. In their eyes, Stalin, who followed Lenin in the international communist movement, as the leader and mentor, was the authority of the theory of Marxism-Leninism, was the leader in the Communist countries, and was an example of socialist States.

However, with the passage of time, Sino-Soviet relations would be inevitably changed in second stage. It emerged real conflicts of two sides; which manifests that China should depend on self. The assistant only can help one a short time, while in a long time, it needs constantly struggling and development, so China had to found out the road of constructing socialism by itself. It was impossible to semi-depend on Soviet Union. The situation needed China stood by its own foot, achieve completely independence.

In 1958, Khrushchev, who was the successor of Stalin, came into the power and gradually the relations of two parties involved began to direct toward the negative. On June 20, 1959, Soviet unilaterally tore up a new defense technology agreement, refused to provide samples of nuclear bomb and the production technology. When Khrushchev visited the United States, on September 15, he propagandized the spirit of “David Camp”, practicing the policy, “Soviet -US cooperation could dominate the world”, which led to break up of Sino-Soviet relations in 1960s. The two sides doubted the intention of them and there was no mutual distrust.

China and the Soviet Union both attached important the ideology, so the two parties were bound to find ideological reasons and root causes in theory, route, and policies when more and more problems appeared. Because of the emergence of the disputes, the CPC Central Committee and Mao began to doubt the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee and Khrushchev were contrary to Marxism-Leninism, and then make a judgment that Khrushchev had embarked on a road of revisionist or semi-revisionist. At the same time, Soviet also thought China deviated from that of the principles, and made the mistakes such as dogmatism and adventurism. “The Nine Comment” was published by China showed the relations of the two countries arrived the high degree of contradiction. Especially through the battle of “Treasure Island” in 1969, the two countries completely broke the ties.

From then on, Sino-Soviet relations kept preparing for defense and 9 years negotiation. There was no huge military conflict on the boarder of two sides. it was until the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee General Secretary Gorbachev visited China on May 15, 1989, the two parties ended the abnormal relations of Sino-Soviet and recovered the normal condition which was the new stage of history.

c) Going toward independent

The anew beginning of Sino-Soviet relations shows that China has completely entered into an independent period of development, so Soviet Union pay more intention to Chinese strength. At the rupturing period between China and Soviet Union, China actively established other diplomatic relations with other socialist countries or west countries. There are two good examples to show Chinese ability to go out its depending on Soviet Union and play a key role in process of dealing with the dangerous events in international community. One is North Korea, the other is Vietnam.

The great achievement was China help North Korea defeat America. The victory of the War completely shattered the attempting of US-led Western imperialist countries which wanted to subvert the Chinese socialist construction. Meanwhile, it showed New China have the ability to control the situation without depending on Soviet Union.

North Korea is located northeast of China. China and the Korean Peninsula in geographically linked by mountains and river. The two countries had close relation in history, and bilateral relations have been no major conflict and deteriorating. Especially in 1950s, China-North Korea coalition forces resisted the U.S. aggression and achieved a historic victory.

June 5, 1950 the Korean War broke out, the U.S.-led 15 countries to send troops to participate in the Korean War, North Korea asked help from China. June 28, Mao said: "The Chinese had stated that the countries of the world affairs should be solved by themselves, and not be managed by the United States, it only caused extensive and firm resistance when United States invaded Asia. It is absolutely no justification that United States interfered North Korea's internal affairs”.

In the critical situation, Mao made a resolute decision:" We believe that we should and must enter into the war. We have more interests when involving in the battle and have great lose if standing aside”. After 13 days and nights fiercely righted, the U.S. Chinese forces initially stabilized the situation of Korean War. On December 6, Chinese forces regained Pyongyang which was occupied for 47 days by the U.S. military, it was reversed the situation in a large extend. In July 27, 1953, the United States was forced to a signed a cease-fire agreement and promised to negotiate and cease fire in Panmunjom in North Korea. This was the first time to United States to sign on the agreement which was failure.

Vietnam is another important example to manifest China increasingly had the ability to enter into full independent in diplomatic relation without depending on others and shake off the controlling of Soviet Union.

From 1950 to 1978, the total value of assistance which Vietnam got from China was more than 20 billion U.S. dollars.[5]This was a result of thrifty of Chinese people and reducing of financial development of China. But when Vietnam reunification completed, it put forwarded some unreasonable request, such as claiming territory from China, excluding Chinese in its home, and seeking hegemony at part region. It regarded China as “most direct and dangerous enemy “and “new target of battle”. From the beginning of 1974, it provoked the event of invading Chinese border and increased it year by year, there were 1100 conflicts until 1978.[6] At last, on February 17, 1979, China had to fight back to safeguard itself and made the victory. This event gave a message to Soviet Union that it was no longer a myth of the socialist camp.

d) The friendly relations between China and East Europe

When refereeing the relation between China and other socialist countries, it is inevitable to talk about East Europe. The relations between China and East Europe were successful and friendly because of the distance. Even if it emerge some disputes, “the elder brother”, Soviet Union, was to mediate. So totally, China and East Europe looked forward the Soviet Union at the stag; there were no much touch than the two neighbors.

e) The attitude of West countries

West countries attitude to relationships between China and socialist countries was hatred when New China was founded. They use all kinds of methods to hinder it, especially waged the war in Vietnam and North Korea to give pressure to China, but it showed that these behaviors set up some difficulties in the process of Chinese revolution and not exterminated it.

The opponent who was headed by Harry S. Truman (1884—1972) in America wrote a book which name was” the Relationship between America and China” to attack the diplomatic policy of the People’s Republic of china with Soviet Union. at the book, there were some point views that the People’s Republic of china learn from Soviet Union was “subjected to the Soviet Union”, “Chinese Communist Party was the fifth team of International Communist Party”, and was “a dog of the red imperialism “ etc.

British Prime Minister Winston Churchill also opposed the communist countries. He said:” all the famous city and residents were controlled by the power of Soviet Union.” he suggested that U.K. and U.S. should cooperate each other to combat with Soviet Union hand by hand, so the imperialism bloc was formed under leading by U.K. and U.S. to confront the socialism camp under leading by Soviet Union.

3) China from full independence to becoming the model of the socialist camp. （1989-2008）

With the reform of China, its economical strength got a great enhance; and the living standard of Chinese people changed greatly. Also, China gained high prestige in international community. In 1989, because the Soviet Union was collapse, the socialist countries nearly changed the color except China, North Korea, Vietnam, Cuba, and Laos. There are only a few socialist countries after the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Not only China could not depend on anyone, but China has become the model of the socialist camp due to its composite strength.

a) The relationship between China and North Korea

The ability of dealing with nuclear issue of North Korea showed China has play one of the key role in the multipolar policy of the world. The relationship between China North Korea became subtle in this stage. Because of the issue of security was a focus in international community, except the historical geography and cultural factors, one of the most important reason is that the security of the Korean Peninsula is linked with that of Northeast China, play a important role of defense of northern coastal areas, and have a very important military and strategic significance of maintaining peace, friendship and stability of the surrounding international environment of China.

 “From the geo-strategic point of view, the mainland countries are usually seen the peninsula as the country's territorial defense shield, while Maritime countries regarded the peninsulas and islands as the springboard of the invasion of another country, even an expansion to the mainland in depth.”[7]

 “China is willing play a constructive role to promote stability and ease in the process of peninsula development “[8]

As the nuclear issue of North Korean, the six-party talks was repeatedly delaying, China and North Korea's relations had some problems. However, on September 3, 2001, the CPC Central Committee General Secretary and State President Jiang Zemin and WPK General Secretary, National Defense Commission Chairman Kim Jong-il held a talk in Pyongyang. The two sides exchange views on regional issues of common concern. Jiang reiterated the Chinese position of the issue of Korean peninsula. He said: "it is very important to safeguard and promote peace and stability of the peninsula. China, as a close neighbor of the Korean Peninsula, is very concerned about the form of development and changes of the peninsula. China is always committed to safeguarding and promoting peace and stability of the peninsula and supporting both the north and south. China made positive efforts to promote North-South dialogue, improve mutual relations, ease the situation on the peninsula, supporting the independent and peaceful reunification of both the north and south, and backing North Korea to improve relations of the U S, Japan, the European Union and other countries and eventually to achieve normalization of relations. [9]

b) The relations between China and Vietnam

The relations between China and Vietnam also restored normalization after the board conflict of two sides in 1979. In the period from January,1989 to August,1991, the two parties involved held five rounds discussion which were taken part in by the vice diplomatic minister in Bei Jing and Hanoi. On November 5, 1991, the General Secretary of Vietnamese Communist Party visited China formally, and the event indicated the relations of two sides achieved normalization. From then on, all kinds of field such as economy, transport, post, education banking, and so on, developed and cooperated in all direction.

In January, 1989, the minister of diplomacy of Cuba visited China. This action showed that the relations of sino-cuba had completely restored and the two parties involved “had entered into a period of full development”[10]

c) The relations between China and Cuba

Since1989, China and Cuba consistently developed relations of friendly cooperation in political, economical, and cultural field. This year in January and June Cuban Foreign Minister visited to China, Chinese Foreign Minister also visited to Cuba. Since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries, it was the first time to foreign minister to visit the other country. Cuba entered the special period in 1990, such as short oil supplying, urban transportation problems. China timely delivered to a large number of bicycles, in addition, in the same year in October, both side also signed the Protocol that China promised Cuba to construct a bicycle factory with an annual output of 150000. To May 1991, Cuba has been imported Chinese brand-name bicycles of 200,000; to meet the urgent needs of Cuba. In the summer of 1991, because China suffered floods in parts area, Cuba donated 5,000 tons of sugar and worth of 12 million U.S. dollars drugs to China. 1992, the Sino-Cuban Friendship Association of the two countries has resumed its activities. November 1993, President Jiang Zemin visited to Cuba on a short time, but effectively promoted the development of Sino-Cuban relations. By the end of November 1995 to early December, President Castro visited to China. This event regarded as an “an event of Sino-Cuban relations” The visiting has further promoted the bilateral relations which was friendly and cooperative. At present, Sino-Cuban bilateral closely coordinate in international affairs, support each other in bilateral economic and trade relations have developed smoothly, and economic cooperation has also made great progress, Sino-Cuban friendly and cooperative relations "have entered a new stable period of development.[11]

d) The relationship between China and Laos

The relationship between China and Lao peoples Democratic Republic country are always excellent since the two parties have established the diplomatic contact in 1961.the vice premier and the Minister of diplomacy showed that the 40 years witness the development and strengthening of the friendly cooperation of two sides. Especially in late decades, China gave great help in all aspects, the investment of China in Laos nearly achieved 0.1 billion U.S. dollars. It was consistently increase the financial help in economy, culture, and infrastructure.

 “I will be on behalf of the government and people of Laos to appreciate that of China to support the precious and benefit help for ours construct course in the past and at present. The two sides solved the issues of boarder quickly showed that it was an importing paradigm in solving historical events. The future of two sides is bright.[12]

But the west world regarded the help of China to other socialist counties as abnormal situation which was “the new-colonist”, especially America. Samuel P. Huntington, the famous writer of U.S.A, in his book of Who Are We, predicted that China would be the core of threatening of the world and the potential enemy of the America in the future. In order to emphasizing the point, he deliberately marked a sub-title which was Researching the Enemy in the ten chapters. This viewpoint manifested the full independence of China from another side no matter how accuracy it was.

Based on searching the diplomatic relations between China and the Communist Party of the countries above three periods, Generally speaking, it shows that in the process of adhering to the road of socialism, China, In accordance with its actual condition, is from full dependent to the semi-independent, from semi-independent to full independence, from full independence to becoming the model of the socialist camp. The most meaningful enlightenment is that building of socialism in China is relatively successful, and initiates a special feature of the socialist road with the new paradigm. It is the history that chooses the socialist road in China, and not China chooses it. So China, at least in present period, should insist the direction firmly.

Reference:

New Chinese Diplomacy, Wang junyan, Beijing current event press, 1999

Chinese Diplomacy about One Hundred Years, Li Ying, Chinese Economic press, 2000

Master's Thesis, Jin Hongmei, "the Policy of Reunification Korean Peninsula and Chinese Foreign Policy"

On the Role of China in the Korean Peninsula and the Issue of Peace Agreement, Zhang Chunhai, Studies of Northeast Asian, 2001, No. 4

The Big Asian-Pacific countries and the Korean Peninsula, Chen Fengjun, Wang Chuanjian, Beijing University Press, 2002

The speaking on the banquet of welcoming the minister of diplomacy of Cuba, Qian qichen, China Daily, on January 21, 1989

The research of Latin America, Mao xianglin, 1997, No2,

On April 25, 006ed edition, Xin Hua Daily International Telegraph News Agency, the No. of Classification: BG28 A

Who Are We, Writer, Samuel P. Huntington, Translator, Cheng kexiong, Xin Hua Press, 2005.

Abstract: China-North Korea relationship is an important factor that affects peace and stability of Northeast Asia and world, There are many important significances in studying of the relationship. Especially today, North Korea wants to acquire nuclear weapons, how to prevent it to promote regional peace in the use of this relationship is even more important. As the author of this paper, I believe that review the history of China-North Korea relationship will help us get a clear understanding of this issue, so this paper will review China-North Korea relations in the past 60 years with a brief history firstly. After that, I will express my own views on the current situation of China-North Korea relationship. I will also point out which benefits North Korea and China get from the relationship. At the same time, I will focus on the drawbacks to the relationship. Finally, I will speculate future development of China-Korean relations by a brief analysis.

Key Words: relationship, nuclear, peace, development

Introduction to China-North Korea Relationship

China and North Korea have been allies for more than half a century. Beijing is a key provider of food and fuel to Kim Jung-Il's regime, and it is heavily invested in preventing a destabilizing regime collapse that would send North Korean refuges flooding across its northeastern border. But as Kim tests ballistic missiles and develops his nation's nuclear weapons capacity, China may be rethinking its support.[①]

Many professors think that, China’s influence on North Korea is more than it is willing to admit but far less than outsiders tend to believe. Although it shares the international community’s denuclearisation goal, it has its own concept of how to achieve it. It will not tolerate erratic and dangerous behavior if it poses a risk of conflict but neither will it endorse or implement policies that it believes will create instability or threaten its influence in both Pyongyang and Seoul. The advantages afforded by China’s close relationship with the North can only be harnessed if better assessments of its priorities and limitations are integrated into international strategies. Waiting for China to compel North Korean compliance will only give Pyongyang more time to develop its nuclear arsenal.[②]

However, I don’t think so. I think we should review the relationship between China and North Korea ,  it will help us get a new view.

History of China-North Korea Relationship

The China-North Korea relationship remains the most enduring, uninterrupted bilateral friendship for both the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). This brother-in-arms relationship was solidified early during the Korean War. Sharing a common border and ideology, both China and North Korea confront the frustration of divided nations.[③]

From Beijing’s perspective, the logic of the relationship between the PRC and DPRK is tied intimately to the two states’ more than half century of history of battlefield cooperation and military alliance, shared socialist divided nation ideology, the geopolitical balance of power both in Northeast Asia and on the Korean Peninsula, and ambivalent overlapping views of the United States.

  The brother-in-arms relationship the Korean Communists and the Chinese Communists was solidified early during the 1930s, Kim Il Sung, who later became the leader of Communist North Korea, waged an anti-Japanese guerrilla struggle in Manchuria. In the late 1930s and early 1940s, a group of Korean Communists (including Pak Il Yu, who would later become North Korea’s vice prime minister and a head of the “Yan’an faction” within the Korean Workers’ Party [KWP]) traveled to Yan’an, the “Red Capital” of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), to join China’s “War of Resistance” against Japan. During the Chinese civil war between the CCP and the Nationalists in the late 1940s, while Communist

North Korea served as a strategic supporting base for the CCP in Manchuria, around 100,000 ethnic Korean residents in China joined the Chinese Communist forces. The 156th, 164th and 166^th divisions, three of the best combat units of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), were mainly composed of ethnic Korean soldiers.

But the brother-in-arms relationship between China and North Korea was solidified early during the Korean War. Beijing’s decision to enter the war in late 1950 was not taken lightly. While China’s paramount leader Mao Zedong clearly was predisposed to intervene on the Korean Peninsula, many leaders had serious reservations, and others strongly opposed intervention. The consensus of several careful scholarly accounts is that “a high-level policy” debate took place in Beijing. Mao’s forceful personality won out, and the first units of the Chinese People’s Volunteers (CPV) crossed the Yalu River on the night of October 19, 1950. China paid a tremendous cost as the result of this decision in terms of casualties and war-related expenses. By one official Chinese estimate, the CPV’s “combat losses were more than 360,000 (including 130,000 wounded) and noncombat losses were more than 380,000.” Moreover, while the hot phase of the Korean War lasted 3 years, Chinese forces remained on the peninsula for an additional 5 years (until 1958), many assisting in national reconstruction projects.[④]

This de facto alliance was formalized in July 1961 when Beijing and Pyongyang signed a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance. This agreement committed one country to come to the aid of the other if attacked.

Yet Kim, a Korean nationalist in soul and increasingly a dictator in practice, neither tolerated the continuous existence of any remaining pro-foreign faction within his Party nor felt comfortable with having to live under the shadow of a morally superior China. All of this formed one of the most important conditions under which Kim introduced in 1955 the “Juche” ideology, emphasizing that the Korean revolution must be carried out in an indigenous Korean way and must achieve “self reliance” in all spheres. It was against these backdrops that a serious crisis erupted between Pyongyang and Beijing in late 1956.

In the early 1960s, Pyongyang further gained leverage in its dealings with Beijing when a great polemic debate concerning the nature of true communism emerged and intensified between China and the Soviet Union. In appearance, the North Koreans maintained neutrality toward Beijing and Moscow, but in reality they were more sympathetic to Beijing (this was largely due to Kim’s resentment of Nikita Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization campaign and criticism of Stalin’s personality cult).When the CCP was increasingly isolated in the international communist movement with the deepening of the Sino-Soviet split, sympathetic support from Pyongyang became more and more important to Beijing. In a 1964 conversation with Choi Yong Kun, North Korea’s second in command, Mao even asked him to comment on whether or not the Soviet Union would attack the PRC from the north, trying to win firmer support from Pyongyang. During this period, although Beijing’s influence upon Pyongyang was further reduced, Chinese–North Korean relations—now based upon a foundation that was quite different from that of the early and mid-1950s—were very close. The situation, however, changed in the mid-1960s.On the one hand, after Khrushchev’s downfall in October 1964, the new Soviet leadership started providing more material support to the DPRK; on the other, the eruption of the “Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution” in 1966 sunk China’s Party, state and society into great chaos, causing the PRC’s external relations in general—and its relations with the DPRK in particular—to be severely derailed. Consequently, Chinese–North Korean relations reached low ebb from 1967-1969, when the Cultural Revolution was experiencing its most hectic stage. The Red Guards in China widely made Kim Il Sung a target of criticism, proclaiming that North Korea, like the Soviet Union, had degenerated into a “revisionist country.” And the Beijing leadership, which was by itself in constant disorder, did little to stop these activities. At some points it even seemed that the PRC-DPRK alliance was going to be undermined.[⑤]

When both Beijing and Pyongyang strongly felt the negative impact caused by the deterioration of their relationship, they started to take action to improve relations. In January 1968, when a serious crisis erupted between the DPRK and the United States after the U.S. intelligence vessel Pueblo and its crew were captured by the North Koreans, the PRC government issued a statement on January 29, 1968 to provide “firm support” to the DPRK. Then a dramatic turn in Chinese–North Korean relations occurred on September 30, 1969, the eve of the 20th anniversary of the PRC’s establishment. Although Beijing had decided in principle that no foreign delegation would be invited to attend the celebrations for the anniversary, at 3:20 p.m. on September 30, “for the purpose of improving Chinese-Korean relations,” Beijing issued an invitation for a top North Korean leader to visit Beijing. At 6:25 p.m., Pyongyang replied that Choi Yong Kun would travel to China, and Choi arrived in Beijing at 11:30 that evening. The next day, Mao met with him atop the Gate of Heavenly Peace, telling him that “the relations between our two countries are special and our aims are identical, so we should improve our relations.”[⑥]

As it turned out, the discrepancy demonstrated in the 1975 Deng-Kim meeting was with a meaning much deeper and broader than the issues under discussion. It indicated that Beijing, after persistently pursuing a Korea policy aimed at bringing about revolutionary changes on the peninsula, was willing to live with the status quo. This new tendency in Chinese policy became more evident after Mao’s death in September 1976.

The current relationship between North Korea and China

As fraternal socialist party-states, Beijing and Pyongyang share an ideological affinity. Moreover, both have weathered the collapse of communism of 1989-91 in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. As two of the handful of the world’s “Last Leninists,” the continued existence and health of the other is considerably important. This is not simply a matter of China having a friendly (or at least nonthreatening) neighbor, but it is also linked to the regime’s political legitimacy. If Leninist regimes continue to be toppled, it will be much more difficult for the shrinking remainder to shore up their own legitimacy. Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought are crucial to the formal justification of the Chinese Communist Party’s continued right to rule, and Party leaders cannot renounce this mantle.

  However, the alliance between China and North Korea is not easy .

  Politically, relations are cordial on the surface, but ties between Beijing and Pyongyang have been strained since China’s rapprochement with Seoul in the late 1980s and early 1990s. China sent a large delegation of athletes to South Korea for the 1986 Asian Games and followed, 2 years later, by attending the Seoul Olympics, increasing trade investment links with South Korea, and then formally establishing full diplomatic ties in 1992. All of this angered North Korea and resulted in cooler relations. However, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of Soviet economic and military aid, Pyongyang was forced to adopt a pragmatic and moderate approach to Beijing and exhibit a more conciliatory approach to Seoul. China encouraged North Korea to moderate its militarist stance and reform its economy. Chinese efforts, for example, seemed critical to persuading North Korea to join the United Nations simultaneously with South Korea in 1991. Beijing appears to be having some success, and bilateral relations warmed with two visits within 8 months by Pyongyang’s leader Kim Jong Il to China. These visits appeared to signal a softening of North Korea’s hard line and increased interest in the Chinese experience with economic reform. The first visit, in May 2000, was made on the eve of the historic summit between the leaders of the two Koreas held in the North Korean capital. The second visit, in January 2001, seemed to presage more steps to implement economic reform in the DPRK. [⑦]However, viewed from the vantage point of early 2004, the results have been disappointing. The great promise of the June 2000 inter-Korean summit has not materialized, and a reciprocal visit by the North Korean leader to Seoul has yet to occur. Economic reform in the North appears, at best, to be sputtering and, at worst, virtually nonexistent. Tensions reportedly emerged in the late 1990s over either unmet North Korean demands for Chinese aid or Chinese pressure on North Korea to reform. According to one account, in early 1996 Pyongyang asked for a substantial amount of grain and Beijing responded by offering only a tenth of this. Kim Jong Il was reportedly incensed and threatened to “play the Taiwan card” unless China was forthcoming on an even broader set of demands. Beijing regretted that it was unable to meet all these requests but did offer a more comprehensive package. Pyongyang apparently was mollified. According to another account, a team of Chinese agricultural experts, who visited North Korea in the spring of 1997 under the auspices of the UN Development Program, recommended that their hosts adopt Chinese style reforms without delay. Pyongyang responded by calling Deng Xiaoping a traitor to socialism. Beijing took umbrage and threatened to halt its food aid. Pyongyang responded by initiating talks with Taiwan on the subject of opening direct air links between Taipei and Pyongyang. After the Chinese dropped its threat, the North Koreans broke off talks. Significantly, but perhaps unrelatedly, Beijing also permitted Pyongyang to open a consulate in the newly acquired Special Administrative Region of Hong Kong. Although it is impossible to verify these reports, they indicate the existence of strains in the relationship. So far, these tensions have proved manageable. Nevertheless, relations between the PRC and DPRK appear to have warmed since 1999. Efforts on both sides to be more cordial are evident in President Jiang Zemin’s September 2001 visit to Pyongyang―China’s first head of state visit to North Korea in a decade (the last was by PRC President Yang Shangkun in 1992) and the first since Beijing normalized relations with Seoul. The term “friendly” now regularly is employed by top officials from both sides to characterize their relationship. Both Jiang Zemin and President Kim Yong Nam of the Supreme People’s Assembly used the adjective in their discussions during Jiang’s September 2001 Pyongyang visit. But the PRC-DPRK relationship continues to blow hot and cold. While Kim Jong Il reportedly is keen to have Chinese President Hu Jintao visit Pyongyang in the near future and has issued an invitation, no high-level Chinese leader was invited to attend the DPRK’s 55th annual national celebration in early September 2003.

North Korea benefit from the relationship

Pyongyang is economically dependent on China, which provides most of its food and energy supplies. North Korea gets about 70 percent of its food and 70 to 80 percent of its fuel from China. Beijing is Pyongyang's largest trading partner, and an estimated 300,000 North Koreans live in China, many of them migrant workers who send much-needed remittances back home.

From : Ministry Of Commerce, PRC

China is also a strong political ally. "As an authoritarian regime that reformed, they understand what Kim Jung-Il is most concerned with--survival," Segal says. China has repeatedly blocked UN Security Council resolutions against North Korea, including some threatening sanctions. China has also hosted the Six-Party Talks, a series of meetings in which North Korea, South Korea, Japan, China, Russia, and the United States have tried to resolve the security concerns associated with North Korea's nuclear weapons program. There and in other international forums, China is seen as a buffer between North Korea and the United States and Japan, which favor punitive sanctions and other measures to prevent Pyongyang from gaining nuclear weapons.[⑧]

Reportedly, China has provided some degree of technical assistance for North Korean satellite and missile programs. Moreover, according to media reports U.S. intelligence believes that Beijing may have been providing indirect assistance to Pyongyang’s nuclear program until very recently.

China benefit from the relationship

China's support for Pyongyang ensures a stable nation on its northeastern border, as well as providing a buffer zone between China and democratic South Korea. North Korea's allegiance is also important for China as a bulwark against U.S. military dominance of the region and the rise of Japan's military.

And China gains economically from its association with North Korea; growing numbers of Chinese firms are investing in North Korea and gaining concessions like preferable trading terms and port operations. Chinese trade and investment in North Korea now totals $2 billion per year. "They're becoming a stakeholder in the North Korean economy," Pinkston says.[⑨]

From :Ministry Of Commerce, PRC

Pyongyang’s imports from China since 1985 have hovered between approximately U.S.$329 million and U.S.$600 million annually. Meanwhile, the DPRK’s exports to the PRC have fluctuated wildly―a reflection of Pyongyang’s erratic economic performance―from a low in 1999 of U.S.$41.7 million to a high of U.S.$297 million in 1993.North Korea’s trade deficits with China are sizeable and growing: estimated at U.S.$4.5 billion between 1990 and 2002 (Pyongyang has imported U.S.$6.1 billion from Beijing but only exported U.S.$1.7 billion), with an average annual bilateral deficit since 1995 of more than U.S.$350 million.19 Smuggling and unofficial trade across the PRC-DPRK border seem commonplace, and this commerce may be equal to the value of at least half of the “official” figure.[⑩]

Illegal population flows are also common occurrences along the China-North Korea border. As many as 300,000 North Korean refugees currently live a perilous existence in China. Some are temporary visitors―one member of a family earning desperately needed cash or food to take back to other family members remaining in North Korea; others are seeking more permanent sanctuary in China. A significant number of the refugees are children― either orphaned or abandoned by parents at their wits’ end. Of those children who do remain north of the Yalu River, some are adopted by childless Chinese couples. A sizeable number of the refugees appear to be women, and many are either forced (or sold by their families) into prostitution or marriage to poor Manchurian peasants unable to find Chinese wives. Other North Koreans provide a cheap source of factory labor for Chinese businesses in Northeast China. They tend to be exploited by factory managers who pay them extremely low wages and provide terrible living and working conditions because they know these unfortunates are powerless illegal aliens subject to immediate deportation from China.

Drawbacks to the relationship

Pyongyang is not an ally Beijing can count on. Kim Jung-Il's foreign policy is, like its leader, highly unpredictable. "North Korea is extremely difficult to deal with, even as an ally," says Daniel Sneider, the associate director for research at Stanford's Asia-Pacific Research Center and a former longtime foreign correspondent specializing in Asia. "This is not a warm and fuzzy relationship," he says. "North Korean officials look for reasons to defy Beijing." Some experts say the missile tests were just one example of North Korea pushing back against China's influence. ""It was certainly a sign of independence [and] a willingness to send a message to China as well as everyone else," Segal says. The Chinese, who favor "quiet diplomacy" with North Korea instead of public statements, took the unusual step of making public the fact that Wen Jiabao, the Chinese premier, warned North Korea not to launch their missiles. The fact that Pyongyang did anyway has hurt China's image, other experts say.[11]

All of this told us the real situation between China and North Korea. The China-North Korea relationship started off on the right foot: North Korean communists provided support and a strategic base for the Chinese communists in 1949. China reciprocated with massive military intervention saving Kim Il Sung’s regime from collapse following his invasion of the South. Yet the honeymoon was short-lived, and tensions arose that last even until today. Despite the fact that the PRC has been the DPRK’s key ally in the past half century, Beijing’s relations with Pyongyang are by no means without problems. While the ties between them seem to have been dominated by a discourse of “lips and teeth” solidarity, there were times that substantial differences in perception and practice existed between the two communist allies. In a sense, the legacies of the uneasy history of Chinese–North Korean relations are mirrored in the complexity of the PRCDPRK relationship today, revealing the limits to which Beijing may influence the orientation of Pyongyang’s attitudes and policies. In practice, China has shown far more interest in cultivating its important economic relations with South Korea than in rejuvenating its ideological partnership with North Korea. Beijing’s interaction with Seoul has not gone unnoticed by Pyongyang; official DPRK histories have now all but erased mention of past Chinese assistance. [12]

What is likely to happen to the China-North Korea relationship

Despite the tensions caused by the recent missile tests, the relationship will likely continue to be close. Each side has too much invested in the other to drastically change the situation, experts say. If North Korea continues to test missiles, it's possible that China will react more strongly than it has in the past. Most of the nations involved in the crisis will try to bring North Korea back to the Six-Party Talks. [13]

However, the real problem is not what Beijing is willing to do, but what it is in a position to do. Beijing’s relationship with Pyongyang in the past half century, though close in a general sense, has not been harmonious. And Beijing’s ability to influence the orientation of Pyongyang’s attitudes and policies has been quite limited.

Although Beijing’s relations with North Korea began to be renormalized in recent years (1999-2001), due in no small part to shared threat perceptions emanating from the America-led Kosovo war, there remains just beneath the surface a highly asymmetrical interdependence in all political, military, and economic issue areas. This is still a fragile relationship of strategic convenience fraught with the underlying tensions and asymmetries of mutual expectations and interests. Thanks to growing enmeshment in the global community, China’s concept and practice of “security” has experienced considerable modification in the post-Mao era of reform and opening, while North Korea remains an insecure hermit kingdom, a country with seemingly fatal contradictions on the verge of explosion or implosion Faced with asymmetrical interdependence realities on the ground, Beijing seeks to achieve multiple, mutually competing goals on several fronts. These goals include maintaining peace and stability on the Korean peninsula, promoting economic exchange and cooperation with South Korea, helping North Korea’s regime survive, halting the flow of North Korean refugees into Jilin Province, stopping the rise of ethnonationalism among ethnic Chinese-Koreans, and enhancing China’s influence in Korean affairs. Put simply, China’s foreign-policy wish list with respect to its northeast neighbor includes at least five “no’s”: no instability, no collapse, no nukes, no refugees or defectors, and no conflict escalation. Nonetheless, China’s geopolitical calculus must also be understood in a larger context of grand strategic goals and practical means of international conduct that Chinese leaders have pursued.Viewed in this light, China’s foreign policy forms a double triangulation: domestic, regional, and global levels interact in the pursuit of three overarching demands and goals. The first is economic development, with an eye to enhancing domestic stability and legitimacy. The second is promotion of a peaceful and secure external environment free of threats to China’s sovereigntyand territorial integrity in Asia. And the third overarching goal is cultivation of its status as a responsible great power in global politics. In order to compensate for growing domestic security and legitimacy deficits, Beijing’s foreign policy faces intense demand to accelerate economic development and restore China’s great-power status in the world. China’s fourth-generation leadership now officially proclaims the maintenance of domestic stability, or the successful establishment of a “well-off society” (xiaokang shehui) as the single greatest challenge in the years ahead.[14]

For the DPRK, however, the most daunting challenge is how to survive as it seeks more aid as an external life–support system, without triggering a cataclysmic system collapse. According to the ROK Ministry of Unification, over 20 percent of food and over 50 percent of fuel in North Korea comes from foreign aid. The end of the Cold War, the demise of the Soviet Union, and the end of Sino-Soviet rivalry have transformed both the context and the condition for maintaining the traditional “lips-to-teeth” strategic ties. Still, North Korea has earned a reputation as “the power of the weak,” creating and using crises to extract concessions to compensate for growing domestic failings. With continuing asymmetries of needs and expectations, Beijing’s foreign policy objectives coalesce, clash, or compete with those of Pyongyang in situation-specific ways.

References:

1)        http://www.nytimes.com/cfr/world/slot2_071306.html?_r=1&oref=slogin#

2)        http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3920

3)        Andrew Scobell: CHINA AND NORTH KOREA:FROM COMRADES-IN-ARMS TO ALLIES AT ARM’S LENGTH

4)        CHEN JIAN: Limits of the ‘Lips and Teeth’ Alliance: An Historical Review of Chinese-North Korean Relations

5)        SAMUEL S. KIM China and North Korea in a Changing World

6)        Zhu Feng : Shifting Tides: China and North Korea

7)        HAZEL SMITH: Asymmetric Nuisance Value: The Border in China-DPRK Relations

        陶常梅,李晓光: “一条线”外交政策下的中朝关系, 安徽教育学院学报2006年9月第24卷第5期

9)        陶常梅，朱广斌，林国亮: “独立自主”外交政策下的中朝关系, 山东省农业管理干部学院学报, 2008年第23卷第2期

10)    陶常梅,林国亮:略论“一边倒”外交政策下的中朝关系,安徽教育学院学报,2006年1月第22卷第1期